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Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in addition to the 
parties named in the caption, the following parties were named as defendants in this matter 
below: 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuantto UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3 )(j), 
and this Court transferred Carol Christiansen's appeal to the Utah Supreme Court for that 
reason. See Order, dated November 12, 2004. Union Pacific Railroad Company's cross-
appeal also was to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court thereafter transferred 
this matter back to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4). 
Therefore, this Court now has jurisdiction over Carol Christiansen's appeal and Union 
Pacific Railroad Company's cross-appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue on Appeal: Was the trial court correct in ruling that Carol Christiansen's Federal 
Employers' Liability Act claim against Union Pacific Railroad Company for an asbestos-
related injury was time-barred because he admitted knowing of his alleged asbestos-related 
illness more than three years prior to when he commenced his action and also then knew (and 
at least should have diligently investigated and further confirmed his conclusion) that 
asbestos was the cause? 
Issue on Cross-Appeal: Did the trial court err in not also ruling that Carol 
Christiansen's Federal Employers' Liability Act claim against Union Pacific Railroad 
Company was subject to dismissal because he did not have evidence to prove Union Pacific 
Railroad Company knew or should have known, at the time of the purported exposures, that 
the level of any such exposures to inhaleable asbestos were sufficient to cause harm? 
Standard of Review: The "correction-of-error" standard applies to both issues because 
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whether a defendant is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law. Wilson v. Valley 
Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 417-18 (Utah 1998) (correction-of-error standard applies to 
whether a party is entitled to summary judgment); Sanns y. Butterfield Ford. 2004 UT App 
203, f l , 94 P.3d 301, 303 (same); Corbett v. Seamons, 904 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah Ct App. 
1995) (correction-of-error standard applies to whether a party has established a prima facie 
case); Handy y. Union Pac. R. Co.. 841 P.2d 1210,1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (same). 
Preservation of Issues: All these issues were raised by Union Pacific Railroad 
Company in both its initial memorandum (R. 470-73, 447-69, 197-351) and reply 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment (R. 613-95) and in oral 
argument (R. 1353). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
As to defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company only, this action is based upon the 
Federal Employers5 Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § § 51 et seq. The liability-related portion of this 
federal statute, the first paragraph of Section 51, reads as follows: 
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the 
several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territories, or between 
the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or between the District 
of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall 
be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such 
carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her 
personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and 
children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if 
none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death 
resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or 
employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency,, due to its 
negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, 
wharves, or other equipment. (Emphasis added.) 
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The portion of this federal legislation pertaining to the time period in which an action for 
negligence must be commenced, as a condition precedent to the right to bring such an action, 
the first paragraph of Section 56, reads in pertinent part as follows: 
No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years 
from the day the cause of action accrued. (Emphasis added.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Appellant and Cross-Appellee, Carol Christiansen ("Mr. Christiansen"), commenced 
this action against approximately 28 defendants who were alleged to be responsible for over 
100 alternate predecessor or related entities. (R. 6-9.) Appellee and Cross-Appellant Union 
Pacific Railroad Company ("UPRR") is one of those defendants. (R. 9.) It is the only 
defendant alleged to be liable to Mr. Christiansen under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
("FELA"). (R. 2.) Nevertheless, Mr. Christiansen simply alleged generally that he had an 
asbestos-related injury for which all defendants were liable for exposing Mr. Christiansen 
to inhaleable asbestos fibers. (R. 1-9.) 
This case is one of the many "asbestos cases" that have been filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court and assigned to Judge Iwasaki. As such, it is subject to a Case Management 
Order ("CMO") entered by Judge Iwasaki for the management of "asbestos cases."1 Sections 
II and III of the CMO pertain to discovery. Duties are therein imposed upon the plaintiffs 
in asbestos cases, including Mr. Christiansen, to produce specific information about the 
exposures to asbestos alleged only generally in the complaint. (CMO at 6-14.) In Section 
1
 Copies of the last three versions of the CMO are included in the Appendix hereto. 
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IV, it is contemplated that plaintiffs will voluntarily dismiss those defendants against whom 
there is insufficient evidence after discovery. (CMO at 15-16.) This procedure differs from 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by allowing plaintiffs to initiate actions against numerous 
defendants with only general allegations and without having a specific factual basis to 
support a claim against each named defendant, and thereafter, following discovery, allowing 
plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss defendants without being subject to sanctions or even costs. 
If a defendant is not voluntarily dismissed, it may move for summary judgment under Rule 
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.) 
Mr. Christiansen's general complaint was filed on January 9,2002. (R. 1.) In March 
2002, Mr. Christiansen served his initial disclosures wherein he stated that he worked for 
UPRR only for a short time during the early 1950s in Evanston, Wyoming and in Pocatello, 
Idaho. He stated in his disclosure that he was "unaware" of any exposure to asbestos when 
he worked in Wyoming and that he only "may have been" exposed to asbestos when he 
worked in Idaho. (R. 33-35, 241-52; see specifically R. 244.) Mr. Christiansen did not 
provide his answers to master interrogatories, as required by the CMO, until February 2003. 
(R. 169-71.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Christiansen also served his answers to special 
interrogatories and document requests served by UPRR after Mr. Christiansen failed to 
identify any exposures to asbestos while he worked for UPRR. (R. 172-74.) Mr. 
Christiansen did so only after UPRR filed a motion to compel, and in lieu of opposing that 
motion. (R. 138-68.) 
In his answers to the CMO required master interrogatories, Mr. Christiansen only 
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referred to an exhibit A for information about his purported asbestos exposures, and that 
exhibit merely repeated what was provided previously in his initial disclosures, without any 
specific information about exposures to asbestos for the limited time he worked for UPRR. 
(R. 253-97.) (Differing from the lack of information pertaining to UPRR, he did identify 
therein specific products of the manufacturer defendants from which he had extensive 
exposures to asbestos when he worked for other entities in the construction, pipeline and 
roofing industries. (Id-)) Likewise, in his answers to UPRR's special interrogatories and 
document requests, Mr. Christiansen continued to provide no information about any specific 
exposures to asbestos when he worked for UPRR in the early 1950s. Instead, Mr. 
Christiansen merely referred to his answers to the master interrogatories. (R. 313-30.) 
UPRR's counsel met and conferred with Mr. Christiansen's counsel before proceeding 
with UPRR's motion to compel, that still was warranted in light of Mr. Christiansen's failure 
to provide any information about specific asbestos exposures he contends to have had when 
he worked for UPRR. (R. 331-34.) The result of that meeting was Mr. Christiansen's 
counsel's agreement to obtain and produce as specific information as possible about Mr. 
Christiansen's purported work place exposures. (R. 335-37.) Up through the close of 
discovery, other than his own deposition testimony, Mr. Christiansen never produced any 
additional information pertaining to how he was exposed to inhaleable asbestos fibers when 
he worked for UPRR. (R. 338-41.) 
The scheduling order entered by Judge Iwasaki in this case provided that defendants' 
post-discovery requests for voluntary dismissal, known in the CMO as "No Evidence 
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Letters," could be submitted to Mr. Christiansen on or after June 27, 2003, and that 
dispositive motions were to be filed by November 14,2003. (R. 359-61, ^  2 and 7.) Since 
Mr. Christiansen had not produced specific exposure information pertaining to UPRR, on 
August 21,2003, UPRR submitted its No Evidence Letter to Mr. Christiansen. (R. 342-93.) 
Therein, UPRR pointed out the lack of any evidence showing Mr. Christiansen was exposed 
to inhaleable asbestos while working for UPRR not to mention evidence showing any 
exposure to a level that UPRR knew or should have known could be hazardous to Mr. 
Christiansen. (R. 342.) UPRR also pointed out that the evidence of record showed that Mr. 
Christiansen had knowledge of his illness because he was experiencing symptoms that had 
become manifest for as long as 10 to 15 years, thereby time-barring any FELA claim against 
UPRR. (Id.) 
Mr. Christiansen denied UPRR's No Evidence Letter on the basis that although the 
symptoms of the illness were manifest he did not receive medical confirmation that his illness 
was caused by asbestos until a doctor more recently told him so, and on the basis of what Mr. 
Christiansen merely did when at work for UPRR, relying solely on Mr. Christiansen's 
deposition testimony. (R. 344.) Therefore, on November 14, 2003, the deadline for 
dispositive motions, UPRR filed its motion for summary judgment after giving Mr. 
Christiansen every opportunity to provide information about any asbestos exposures he had 
when at work for UPRR. (R. 470-73, 447-69, 197-351.) 
UPRR's motion raised two grounds for entry of summary judgment in its favor. First, 
UPRR contended that despite Mr. Christiansen's CMO-based obligations and motion to 
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compel-related promises to produce evidence to support a claim of UPRR's FELA liability, 
which requires evidence on all elements of negligence, the record was void of evidence that 
he was subject to any actual, non-speculative exposures to asbestos while at work for UPRR. 
Not only was there a lack of evidence of any exposure at all to any particular quantity of 
friable asbestos, there was no evidence that UPRR knew or should have known before any 
exposure in the early 1950s that an exposure to the extent experienced by those in Mr. 
Christiansen's craft would be hazardous.2 (R. 454-60.) Second, UPRR contended that Mr. 
Christiansen's FELA claim was time-barred because Mr. Christiansen's injury had manifest 
itself no later than the mid-1990s, at least seven years before his action was commenced, and 
the FELA requires actions to be commenced within three years of accrual. (45 U.S.C. § 56.) 
In fact, Mr. Christiansen knew of his illness and that his illness was caused by asbestos. 
Also, a diligent investigation at the time he knew of his illness could have uncovered the 
asbestos-related cause he now alleges against UPRR. (R. 460-66.) 
Mr. Christiansen countered UPRR's motion in an opposition memorandum filed 
January 2, 2004. Mr. Christiansen argued that he was exposed to high levels of asbestos 
which UPRR knew to be hazardous, and the three year period to commence FELA actions 
was met because Mr. Christiansen did not have a doctor tell him of the alleged asbestos-
2Mr. Christiansen's complaint also included a claim for a violation of the Boiler 
Inspection Act ("BIA") which, if violated, constitutes negligence per se under the FELA. 
However, Mr. Christiansen did not oppose the dismissal of that claim because he 
conceded he could not show a violation of the BIA which requires an injury from a defect 
on a locomotive being operated while in service on line. Mr. Christiansen ultimately 
agreed that he did not have any asbestos exposure from a locomotive in service on line; 
thus, that claim was voluntarily dropped at the hearing on UPRR's motion for summary 
judgment (R. 1353 at 1-2.) 
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related cause of his symptoms until 2002. (R. 541-600.) UPRR filed its reply memorandum, 
pointing out that the evidence of record did not support and the law was contrary to Mr. 
Christiansen's arguments, on January 14, 2004. (R. 613-94.) Oral argument was held on 
April 12, 2004. (R. 1353.) 
On April 26, 2004, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision. (R. 885-88.) 
Therein, the trial court stated that it was persuaded that Mr. Christiansen had "set forth facts 
sufficient to create a duty and show a breach of that duty," but that the action against UPRR 
nevertheless was time-barred. The trial court stated: 
Indeed, claims for exposure accrue when "the accumulated effects of the deleterious 
substance manifest themselves." Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163,170(1949). In the 
instant, plaintiff admits knowing he was severely injured, even before he quit working 
at his own roofing business in 1995. Moreover plaintiff admits subjectively believing 
asbestos was harmful and that his illness was caused by asbestos. Under any reading 
of these facts, plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of both his injury and 
its cause by the mid-1990,s. Accordingly, Defendant Union Pacific's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
(R. 887.) The trial court's Order Dismissing Union Pacific Railroad Company was entered 
July 6,2004. (R. 942-43.) The trial court also awarded UPRR its costs allowed by law. (R. 
946-47.) 
At the time UPRR was dismissed from this action, Mr. Christiansen still had pending 
claims against other defendants. Consequently, Mr. Christiansen moved for a Rule 54(b) 
certification entitling him to appeal the dismissal of UPPR. (R. 950-56.) UPRR did not 
oppose that motion, and the trial court granted Mr. Christiansen's request. (R. 977-79.) On 
October 18,2004, the trial court entered its Entry Of Final Judgment As To Plaintiffs Claims 
Against Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company. (R. 985-86.) Mr. Christiansen timely 
-8-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
filed his Notice Of Appeal on November 9, 2004. (R. 1137-38.) UPRR timely filed its 
Notice Of Appeal, pertaining solely to the trial court's ruling that there were sufficient facts 
to create a duty and show a breach of that duty, on November 16, 2004. (R. 1144-45.) 
This Court also should know that as to the remaining defendants below, some of those 
defendants also now have moved for summary judgment, including as a ground that the 
statute of limitations pertaining to the claims against them expired. (E.g., R. 987-88,1175-
77, 1188-94.) Mr. Christiansen also has moved to stay all proceedings during this appeal, 
including for the reason that "the outcome of the issue being reviewed will likely affect the 
claims Mr. Christiansen has against all of the other parties in this case." (R. 1168.) 
Finally, all these motions pending before the trial court are now moot because, in the 
general asbestos docket, this case was included with many other cases in multiple defendants' 
motions to dismiss based on lack of admissible evidence to prove causation of an asbestos-
related injury. (E.g., R. 1135-36.) Judge Iwasaki granted those motions which resulted in 
the dismissal of this particular case, and others, as to all defendants. That ruling would apply 
to UPRR despite the issues now on appeal. Mr. Christiansen's counsel moved for 
reconsideration which recently was denied. An Order of Dismissal as to all defendants has 
yet to be entered by Judge Iwasaki. However, a copy of Judge Iwasaki's Memorandum 
Decision is included in the Appendix. 
UPRR understands that Mr. Christiansen's counsel has expressed an intent to seek an 
appeal of that order along with similar orders in all other cases dismissed for the same reason. 
If it is not appealed, that Order Of Dismissal will moot the issues raised in the instant appeal 
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and cross-appeal. If an appeal of that subsequent ruling is sought, this appeal will not yet be 
moot and should proceed to resolution in order to determine the bases now before this Court 
for upholding the dismissal of at least UPRR. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Mr. Christiansen began his employment with UPRR in 1951. He worked a short 
while, a month or two, in Evanston, Wyoming on some tunnels repairing cracks. That job 
ended soon after he started because a train wreck occurred in the tunnels. Consequently, he 
went to Pocatello, Idaho a month later and hired on as a machinist helper during a "big 
strike." (R. 635-37.) 
Mr. Christiansen was asked, "Do you believe that you were exposed to any asbestos 
in Evanston, Wyoming,?" to which he answered, "I doubt it." (R. 637.) 
In Pocatello, for the first month or so, Mr. Christiansen helped operate a rail detector 
which is a large machine that operates slowly on the railroad track and is capable of detecting 
broken rails. He helped operate that machine to Los Angeles, California, to Omaha, 
Nebraska, and to LeGrande, Oregon. His job was to watch the gauges on the machine. (R. 
638-39.) 
Mr. Christiansen was asked, "Do you believe that you were exposed to any asbestos 
during that month on the rail detector?," and he answered, "I doubt it." (R. 639.) 
Also in Pocatello, Mr. Christiansen assisted with repair work on big steam 
locomotives called "Mallies." The repair work required removal of the tin covering and the 
underlying preformed insulation bolted to the firebox (boiler). He described the insulation 
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as curved sheet asbestos that was "made to fit" the curve of the steam tank, and it had pre-
existing bolt holes for attachment to the locomotives. On occasion, the sheets had to be 
sawed down to fit or new bolt holes cut with a torch. Sometimes he would work an extra 
shift doing "cellar packing" which is putting rags and oil or beeswax in journal boxes to 
provide lubrication for the wheels on the locomotives. He stated that packing was done with 
"asbestos and rags." (R. 639-44.) 
Mr. Christiansen was asked, "And doing this cellar packing, were you, do you believe 
you were exposed to any asbestos?" He responded,"Well, I was there working on those same 
trains, you know, those big Mallies. And they were half asbestos." (R. 644 (emphasis 
added).) 
Mr. Christiansen clearly testified that he believed he was exposed to asbestos when 
he worked for UPRR, as well as at later jobs. (R. 648-49.) Significantly, Mr. Christiansen 
never identified any basis for his belief. Moreover, when asked specific questions about his 
purported exposures to inhaleable asbestos at UPRR, he also minimized such exposures, if 
any. He testified: 
Q. Was it dusty in that shop, other than when they were taking the insulation off? 
A. No. 
Q. Was it dusty when they were taking the insulation off? 
A. Not - - other than just right there. 
* * * 
Q. How big was the back shop? 
A. Probably 300 feet long. 
* * * 
Q. Did they open doors or windows? 
A. Yeah, on the north side of i t . . . on the north side of it, it was - - the first story 
of it was all doors, these big roll-up doors so they could bring trains in and out. 
Q. And if the weather permitted, did they leave those doors open to keep it cooler 
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in there? 
A. Yeah. (R. 665-67.) 
No evidence was submitted by Mr. Christiansen to confirm the existence of actual asbestos 
exposures, or what the level of any exposure would have been. 
Mr. Christiansen worked in Pocatello for UPRR for only one year to the day. (R. 642, 
656.) He then went to work for West Vaco where he recalls working with asbestos powder 
every day for approximately one year. (R. 244.) In 1954, Mr. Christiansen went to work for 
AJ. Curtis Pipeline where he operated machinery and, on a daily basis, installed and fitted 
asbestos paper. (R. 245.) From 1955 to 1956, he worked for Griffiths Construction Pipeline 
and had similar exposures to asbestos. (R. 245-26.) He had the same exposures to asbestos 
when he then worked for Pease Brothers from 1956 to 1957 and then R.H. Fulton Company 
from 1957 to 1965, doing the same type of pipeline work. (R. 247-48.) From 1969 to 1970, 
Mr. Christiansen worked for Gates City Steel where he used asbestos gloves, aprons and 
blankets. Then, beginning in 1970, his employment changed to the roofing industry. From 
1970 to 1971, he worked for De Bowers Roofing; in 1971, he worked for Lynn Smith 
Roofing; and from 1971 to 1996 he operated his own roofing company, Christiansen 
Roofing. During these years, he recalled working with asbestos-containing roofing materials 
of specific manufacturer defendants. (R. 249-50.) 
Mr. Christiansen developed a continuous pain before he retired from his roofing 
business in 1995 or 1996. He also knew at that time that his pain was caused by his 
exposures to asbestos. That pain was ultimately diagnosed as being the result of having 
inhaled asbestos fibers into his lungs, causing asbestosis. Mr. Christiansen's actual 
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testimony regarding these events is so illuminating in light of the issues on appeal that it is 
set forth verbatim. He testified: 
A. . . . that hurt's just stayed the same place. And I've had it for years. 
Q. How long have you had it? 
A. Since about the time I retired, a little before that. 
Q. You retired in '95? 
A. I retired, I was 62 or -3 years old. So it would be seven, eight years ago. 
Q. So you retired seven or eight years ago? 
A. Yeah. And - - well, it got to hurting so bad I had to retire, that's all there was 
to it. I just had to quit. I couldn't make it no more. And so they'd send me 
to one doctor, and they'd diagnose me with this. And they'd treat me for 
congestion. And then the next one would check me out for lung cancer. And 
then they'd decide, well, didn't have lung cancer. So they'd send me to a 
different one. And they'd run me through CAT scans, and I've been through 
so many CAT scans and stuff that, and them open images. I can't even count 
them. And when they decided they couldn't stop that hurt, they'd pawn you 
off onto another one, because when they decide there's nothing they can do for 
you, they pawn you off on somebody else. Maybe this, this doctor might know 
more about it. And then you go through all the same thing again. And so and 
finally I ended up here at the university. And this Dr. Scholand was her name, 
she ran me through every test known to man. And finally she says, Have you 
ever been around asbestos? I told her, yeah. She says, we better check you out 
for it. And first she run me through a couple of cat scans, she said she wanted 
to make dang sure that it wasn't this or that I might have tuberculosis or 
something like that. And she sent me through so many test you can't believe 
it. I just about wore their x-ray machine out. Finally she told me, you've got 
asbestosis. She said definitely. And she said, I want you to go to this other 
doctor, what was his name? 
MRS. CHRISTIANSEN: I cannot remember. 
THE WITNESS: Well, anyhow, he's a doctor up at the university, and that's 
all he works with is asbestos. And he run me through some tests, he said, You 
definitely have asbestosis. And then they got a whole bunch of my x-rays and 
stuff and got to checking them, and they said that they could see the scarring, 
I don't know what scarring. And they said it fit right, the x-rays fit right in the 
scarring the way these places. Well, they said three places, but there's only, 
there's two places that hurt me, and they said there's three places. But there's 
just two places: this big place here and a smaller one right under there that 
hurt. 
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Q. So this male doctor at the university -
A. Yeah. Uh-huh. 
Q. — told you there was scarring in three places? 
A. Uh-huh. He said there's scarring in three places. (R. 650-63.) 
* * * 
Q. When did you first have any kind of thing that you think was a breathing 
problem? 
A. Quite a while ago. 
Q. Approximately when? Eight years, ten years, a hundred years? 
A. It started getting bad probably about the time I quit - - quit working. It was 
getting bad, and right at the same time, I - - my back was hurting me and my 
lungs was hurting me, and I just got to the point where - -1 wasn't hurting 
near as bad as I do now at that time. From about the - -1 started feeling this 
here - - one right here in my back first. And that's been quite sometime 
ago. 
A n d -
Q. Before you started to quit working? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. How long before? 
A. Oh, Maybe - -
Q. Just as best you can tell us. 
A. Eight, ten months, maybe a year. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And it was just progressively getting worse and worse until I knew I had to 
quit. 
Q. Now, you said your back started hurting and your lungs started hurting. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What do you mean by your lungs? How did your lung hurts? 
A. Same as they do now, exactly the same, only they weren't quite as bad. 
Q. What do you mean by that? Back pain again? 
A. No, except under my shoulder blade. 
Q. Okay. But it's a pain? 
A. Yeah, it's a hurt. 
Q. Okay. 
A. It never goes away. 
Q. Like an ache or like a spasm? 
A. It feels just like my lung was growed to my back. 
Q. Do you notice it when you breathe then? 
A. Yeah. And when I breathe, it pulls, like it tries to rip loose, and it just hurts 
solid. (R. 674-75) 
* * * 
Q. At some point you filed a claim for social security disability; is that correct? 
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A. (Witness indicating affirmatively.) 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yep. When I retired. 
Q. So, that was at the same time you retired? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you file the claim before or after you retired? 
A. Right about the same time. (R. 680.) 
* * * 
Q. Your claim for social security disability, what was the basis for that claim? 
A. Lungs. 
Q. And in 1995 when you filed that claim, what was the problem with your 
lungs? 
A. Same thing as I got now. And I don't think it was quite as bad then, you 
know. 
Q. And by - - you said, the same thing you have now. What do you mean? 
A. The same old hurt. It just got worse and worse and worse. 
(R. 680-81.) 
* * * 
Q. And around your testimony there, at least in my notes, I thought I heard you 
say that manufacturers were moving away from asbestos except for some 
coatings, because it was known to be bad. 
A. Yeah. Well, when the government, you know, a few years back when they 
started deciding asbestos was bad, everybody got away from it. 
Q. Okay. Let me explore that with you just a little bit to make sure I 
understand your understanding. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And let's start with when you retired, which I think you said was around 
1995, 1996? 
A. Yeah. Along there. 
Q. Okay. At that period in time, was it your understanding that the 
government had done whatever you just indicated to cause manufacturers to 
move away from asbestos? 
A. Oh, yeah. I think that's why they moved away from it. 
Q. Okay. Was there a period of time before you retired in 1995, 1996 where 
you understood manufacturers were moving away from asbestos? 
A. Oh, yeah. A little before that. Because I recall, like, several times, you 
know, I went out and bid a roof and had an asbestos roof on it. Well, I 
refused to bid them, because you had to pull that roof off, and you had to 
put it in barrels and ship it out to be destroyed. And to get rid of that 
asbestos cost more than you was going to make on the job, so I just 
wouldn't bid them. 
Q. You just wouldn't take that job? 
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A. Yeah. 
Q. Because you had to comply with certain regulations? 
A. Well, certainly. 
Q. And that's, as you understood it, because you knew that there was asbestos 
in the roofing material? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And - -
A. I knew what was asbestos, because we used to use it all the time, and we 
didn't know that there was anything wrong with it. 
Q. So, at least for some period of time before you retired, you had an 
understanding that exposure to asbestos could be harmful? 
A. Why, certainly. Everybody did. They was pulling it out of the schools. 
They was pulling it out of the attics and stuff. From that point on, I was 
real leery of it. Everybody was leery of it. (R. 682-84.) 
* * * 
Q. When was the first one of your friends - - when was the death of the first 
one of your friends who died? 
A. Probably two years ago. Big Ed Meadows. And then the next one was, 
died was Bull Autry. 
Q. And when did you make the connection in your own mind that their deaths 
may be related to asbestos? 
MR. MILLARD: Objection, foundation. Misharacterizes testimony. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know. All of them have died with the same thing 
I've got. 
BYMR.MCGARVEY: 
Q. Do you have an understanding that their deaths are related to any exposure 
to asbestos? 
MR. MILLARD: Same objection. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know. You know - -
BYMR.MCGARVEY: 
Q. I'm not asking you - - again, just to make sure that we're clear, I'm not 
asking you to give me a medical opinion as to what the cause is. I'm only 
asking for your understanding. 
A. Oh, for what I would think? 
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Q. Yes. 
A. I would think that every one of them has the same thing I have. I can give 
you a list of - - I'll take it back, one other man that's still alive out of 42 of 
us. He's here in Salt Lake. He lives right down here in a hotel. He's 
retired. And he's still alive. 
Q. And again, just to make sure you're clear, I'm not asking you to tell me 
medically what their condition is or what the cause is. I'm only asking for, 
in your mind, when you made a connection or a link between their work 
exposures and their problems and their death. 
A. Oh, it's been quite sometime since we - - since, at least since I decided in 
my own mind the connection to asbestos. It's been a while back since - -
Q. Before your retirement or after your retirement? 
A. About the time of my retirement. It - -1 just got to thinking, you know, 
they've done all these tests, and they can't, couldn't do nothing for me. 
And every doctor I went to would come up with something else, something 
else, treat me for something else. They done no good. And when they 
didn't do me no good, they'd kick me to another doctor. You've probably 
got a file this deep on all the doctors I've been to and stuff. And I kind of 
knew in my own mind what was causing it. But the doctors, they want to 
check you out for what they specialize in. 
Q. And what you were thinking in your own mind was those exposures to 
asbestos in the workplace? 
A. Yeah. Uh huh. (R. 686-88.) 
* * * 
Q. And here's a doctor's name with a B, Malcolm Berensen. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Is that the doctor you're referring to? 
A. Yeah, I think that's him. 
Q. And it's your understanding he was an asbestos doctor? 
A. He said he was an asbestos doctor. He's the lung transplant doctor. And 
he's the one that, he said that I had - - either the first or second one that just 
flat said, you have asbestosis. 
Q. Do you remember if he told you anything about what that meant? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What's that? 
A. It's from asbestos. He said it gets in the, into your lungs and just stays 
there. 
Q. Do you remember whether he told you anything about what it meant in 
terms of your symptoms that you were complaining about? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said that's what's the cause of it. 
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So, it's your understanding he told you that the pain that you were asked 
about this morning was caused by this asbestosis? 
Yeah. Yeah. And he told me that they had medicines and pills and stuff 
that they could contain it, but not help it. 
Was that a surprise to you? 
No, didn't surprise me a bit. It just confirmed what I had thought for quite a 
while. (R. 689-90.) 
* * * 
Dr. Berensen also put in his note of December 18, 20- - no, that's the 
document date. Last note was March 18, so it's hard to tell the actual date 
of this note. 
It couldn't have been then, because I haven't seen him then. 
Maybe it was in December. But anyway, he also put in his note that this 
sentence, "He has had lung problems for 10 or 15 years, but recently was 
placed on oxygen because of progression." Is that an accurate statement, 
that you had been experiencing lung problems for 10 or 15 years? 
Yeah. This, they was getting worse and worse and worse. That's why I say 
I'd been to all these doctors, and nobody - - one of them would, he'd treat 
me for this, and when it didn't do no good, he'd kick me to another doctor. 
And they'd run me through all these same tests. I've been through so many 
CAT scans, I'll bet I've bought two or three of them CAT scan outfits. And 
open images and stuff. And virtually zillions of x-rays. And then each one 
of them, when they couldn't do nothing to help it, they'd just kick me to 
another one. And I finally ended up with this Scholand up here. Now, that 
was, that's when the playing quit. 
When the what quit? 
I say that's when the playing quit. When they got me up to that university 
they got serious about finding stuff. They could have told me the thickness 
of my toenails by the time they got done testing me. And so they just went 
through everything. And Dr. Scholand said, asked me if I'd ever been 
around asbestos. I told him yeah. And then she run me through all these 
tests again. A lot of the same ones even. And then after that she sent me to 
this other . . . . (R. 691-92.) 
* * * 
Earlier today you talked about hearing that asbestos was being torn out of 
schools? 
Yeah. 
Do you recall when you heard that? 
I don't remember just when. It's quite a few years back. 
Can you give me a decade? 
I think it was in, sometime in the '80s. 
Can you say whether it was mid, early, late '80s? 
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A. No. I don't know when it was. It was when the government proceeded to 
pull asbestos out of the schools and stuff, and the whole world all of a 
sudden knew that asbestos was bad. 
Q. You also said that at some point the companies quit using asbestos. Do you 
know when that happened? 
A. Probably the same time that this government, you know - - everybody all of 
a sudden - - asbestos was good, you know, 'til all of a sudden it wasn't 
good. Then the whole world, you know, got away from the asbestos. 
Q. So, that was sometime in the '80s? 
A. I'm just guessing, but I think it was in the '80s. 
Q. Why do you think it was in the '80s? 
A. Because that was about the time it was. 
Q. And that's your best recollection? 
A. Yeah. Could have - - yeah, about in the early to mid '80s. (R. 693-94.) 
A July 3,1995, medical report completed as part of obtaining social security benefits 
reads: 
His shortness of breath has been long-standing.... [Approximately five years ago] 
he was having a great deal of difficulty breathing, and his lungs felt "full." Since then 
he periodically gets coughing fits and periodically coughs up blood.. . . It has gone 
on for five years and has not gotten better or worse. (R. 347.) 
Also, on December 18, 2002, Mr. Christiansen reported to Dr. Berensen at that time, as he 
testified, that he had "lung problems for 10 to 15 years," and he testified that his symptoms 
progressively worsened. (R. 350.) 
It should be made clear that Dr. Scholand did not make a "diagnosis" of asbestosis 
before this action was commenced. Mr. Christiansen never has cited to the record where Dr. 
Scholand made that diagnosis at any time. He only has cited his own testimony that he was 
told by Dr. Scholand that he has asbestosis. (E.g., R. 545.) Whereas this action was 
commenced in January 2002, the only evidence of record is that Mr. Christiansen saw Dr. 
Scholand for the first time in November 2002. (R. 351.) At that time, her office note 
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revealed her assessment only to be "history of asbestos exposure," not asbestosis. (Id.) Dr. 
Berenson saw Mr. Christiansen in December 2002, at Dr. Scholand's request, and he also did 
not put in writing that he diagnosed asbestosis. However, he wrote that he was under the 
impression Dr. Scholand had. He wrote in his December 18, 2002 office note: "He is 
referred by Mary Beth Scholand from Pulmonary who cares for his lung disease, specifically 
asbestosis." (R. 350.) Giving Mr. Christiansen the benefit of the doubt, he could have been 
told by Dr. Scholand and/or Dr. Berenson that they believed he had asbestosis, but there is 
no way that occurred before Mr. Christiansen commenced this action on January 9, 2002. 
Significantly, the post-lawsuit diagnosis of asbestosis as the cause of his long-lasting 
symptoms not only could not but did not cause Mr. Christiansen to seek legal advice and file 
an action. He admittedly believed asbestos exposure was the cause all along. He had a 
rational basis for his belief. He understood he had been exposed to a lot of asbestos over the 
years that he also came to understand to be hazardous. (R. 682-84.) He had been going to 
doctors only for treatment, not to investigate and learn the cause of his illness for purposes 
of determining whether he had a claim. They never turned him from his belief. His 
diagnosis of asbestosis did not surprise him. (R. 689-90.) He decided to go see an attorney 
only because of the fact that he was put on oxygen, which "disgusted" him, and that his 
symptoms had increased to the point that they required him to occasionally lay down and take 
medication. (R. 653.) 
C. Marshaling of Evidence 
UPRR here marshals all of the evidence that Mr. Christiansen submitted to the trial 
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court in support of his position that UPRR exposed him to high levels of inhaleable asbestos 
fibers that UPRR knew to be hazardous. As shown through Mr. Christiansen's own 
testimony previously quoted, asbestos was used in many industries and, to his knowledge, 
was not removed from schools and from the asbestos-containing roofing products he worked 
with until the 1980s, at the earliest. Thus, it is critical for him to be able to prove not only 
actual exposure to asbestos during the approximate one year he worked for UPRR in the 
early 1950s, but also that UPRR knew or should have known at that time that his particular 
level of exposures was hazardous. Discussed here is all the evidence advanced by Mr. 
Christiansen for these issues relevant to the existence of a legal duty and a breach of that 
duty. 
Mr. Christiansen's initial disclosure is itself not evidence, but his concession therein 
that he is not aware of any UPRR related asbestos exposure or at most only "may have been" 
exposed to asbestos serves as the starting point. The CMO expressly required Mr. 
Christiansen, who served only a general complaint, to produce information that would 
support a claim of liability. No such information was produced. Turning to Mr. 
Christiansen's own deposition testimony, he again states, as to some job tasks he had, that 
he doubted he had any asbestos exposure. (R. 637, 639.) However, he also states that he 
worked on steam locomotives that used what he believed to be asbestos-containing insulation 
and rags. Mr. Christiansen did not testify that he had any basis for his belief or that he knew 
that he inhaled asbestos fibers. He testified only that where he worked was not dusty. There 
was no dust except right around where the insulation was removed. (R. 665-67.) Therefore, 
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as he initially disclosed, upon the basis of the record it is only a possibility that he was 
exposed to minimal amounts of inhaleable asbestos when at work for UPRR, assuming to be 
true his belief that the insulation contained asbestos. 
There is no evidence in this case to prove exposure to actual inhaleable asbestos fibers 
during Mr. Christiansen's employment with UPRR. Nevertheless, there is a more important 
issue common to all asbestos cases in which UPRR is a named defendant - the issue of 
whether the plaintiff, or in this case specifically Mr. Christiansen, has sufficient evidence that 
UPRR knew or should have known the particular exposures at issue were hazardous thereby 
creating a duty to lessen those exposures to a level that would be considered safe at that time. 
Only with such evidence can a legal duty exist that would be breached by not addressing the 
hazard. Without conceding the lack of evidence of exposures to actual asbestos, UPRR's 
appeal focuses on this broader issue. 
Mr. Christiansen offered no evidence fully addressing this issue of his inability to 
establish a specific duty that he then can show was breached! Here is all that he offered. 
On January 2, 2004, months after the close of expert disclosures and discovery, Mr. 
Christiansen filed with his memorandum in opposition to UPRR's motion for summary 
judgment, as exhibit 2 thereto, the Affidavit Of Kenneth Cohen taken from a different case. 
(R. 585-90.) That affidavit clearly pertained to the plaintiff in whose case it was prepared, 
not Mr. Christiansen. At oral argument, Mr. Christiansen's counsel admitted that many of 
the paragraphs of this affidavit are "not relevant to this case because that's not what he [Mr. 
Christiansen] was doing." (R. 1353 at 8.) Instead, this affidavit was stated to be submitted 
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solely for the proposition that Mr. Cohen is an expert who opines that UPRR knew about the 
hazards of asbestos. (Id.) (As stated above, Mr. Christiansen relied solely on his own 
deposition testimony for evidence of an actual exposure and not on Mr. Cohen whose 
affidavit addressed exposures by someone else.) This affidavit does not show that UPRR 
knew that Mr. Christiansen's particular level of presumed exposures was hazardous. 
Only paragraphs 15 through 18 of this affidavit purport to pertain to the issue of 
UPRR's knowledge of some hazard. They read: 
15. I have reviewed and am familiar with the medical and scientific literature 
regarding the health hazards associated with exposure to asbestos. More 
importantly, I am familiar with the notes and reports made by the American 
Association of Railroad's medical committee regarding asbestos exposure. 
16. As early as the mid 1930s, the American Association of Railroads was aware 
of the health hazards associated with exposure to asbestos, and even made 
recommendations for control practices at that time. 
17. All of the major railroad companies, including Union Pacific, were members 
of the American Association Railroads, and were privy to this information. 
18. In fact, J.R. Nillson, the Chief Surgeon for Union Pacific Railroad, sat on the 
American Association of Railroad's Medical Committee at the time these 
recommendations were made. 
(R. 589.) At most, all these paragraphs show, assuming the statements to be true, is that in 
the mid 1930s the American Association of Railroads was aware of health hazards associated 
with some unidentified level of exposure to asbestos, and UPRR was a member of that 
association and was aware of that unidentified hazard and of the unidentified 
recommendations for control practices. 
What is not addressed in this late attempt to raise expert testimony is the nature or 
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level of what was believed at that time to constitute a health hazard. The only reasonable 
inference is that some level of asbestos exposure still was believed to be safe because only 
"control practices" were recommended at that time, not elimination of any potential asbestos 
exposure such as what occurred in schools in the 1980s. Even Mr. Cohen concedes some 
exposure is safe in his opinion, as to the particular plaintiff in whose case his affidavit was 
prepared, that the exposure he believed existed for that plaintiff was "substantial" and 
"significant." Thus, there must have been a level of exposure believed to be less than 
substantial and significant - that level reasonably believed to be safe. However, Mr. Cohen 
did not address what specific level of exposure was safe and what was considered, in the 
early 1950s or at any other time, to be hazardous. Mr. Cohen did not address whether or not 
Mr. Christiansen's particular exposures in the early 1950s exceeded what was considered 
then to be safe. He did not opine that Mr. Christiansen's exposures were "substantial" or 
"significant" - whatever those vague terms used by Mr. Cohen may mean. Mr. Cohen's 
affidavit does nothing to identify a specific known or discoverable hazard in the early 1950s 
when any purported hazard existed to Mr. Christiansen's alleged peril. 
There is no other evidence to marshal on this key issue of whether there is evidence 
of facts sufficient to create a specific duty and show a breach of that duty. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented by Mr. Christiansen does not raise a disputed issue of material 
fact, and summary judgment was appropriate because Mr. Christiansen knew or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known both of his injury and its alleged cause. 
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It is clear from the record that Mr. Christiansen's symptoms began many years before he filed 
this case. Mr. Christiansen testified that he retired in 1995 because of his symptoms and he 
reported to doctors on at least two occasions that his illness began even earlier. He also 
testified that he knew that his exposures to asbestos, that he had learned to be hazardous, 
caused his illness. He described his conclusion as being more than a suspicion; it was based 
on the reasoning that he knew asbestos was hazardous and that his co-workers with similar 
exposures had his same symptoms. Upon these undisputed facts, the trial court correctly 
applied controlling federal law pertaining to Mr. Christiansen's FELA claim. Mr. 
Christiansen's analysis is not factually nor legally supportable. 
The FELA requires that each element of negligence be established. Mr. Christiansen 
failed to establish the existence of a material duty, with evidence that it was known or 
reasonably foreseeable that a particular level of asbestos exposure was hazardous without 
control practices, and a breach of that duty, with evidence that Mr. Christiansen had such 
excessive exposures. Mr. Christiansen's own deposition testimony does not show what was 
known or reasonably foreseeable. Neither does the affidavit of Ken Cohen support Mr. 
Christiansen's cause of action because it fails to provide the specific evidence required to 
establish a duty that would be relevant to this case, or to show that any duty has been 
breached. Also, that affidavit is inadmissible. Mr. Cohen fails to state the specific facts for 
his opinion, and his opinion is without context. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF UPRR BECAUSE MR. 
CHRISTIANSEN'S FELA CLAIM IS TIME-BARRED. 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment because Mr. Christiansen's FELA 
claim is time-barred since the undisputed material facts show that Mr. Christiansen knew of 
his injury and knew, or at least should have known, of an asbestos-related cause, as he now 
alleges, years before January 9,1999. Claims predicated on the FELA must be commenced 
within three years from when they "accrue." 45 U.S.C. § 56. Mr. Christiansen's FELA 
claim was untimely when filed January 9, 2002. 
A. The Trial Court's Correct Application of the Law to the Undisputed Facts 
The two leading United States Supreme Court cases determining when an FELA 
claim accrues are Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949), and United States v. Kubrick, 444 
U.S. I l l (1979). Under Urie, accrual of FELA personal injury actions allegedly caused by 
prolonged harmful exposures, as opposed to traumatic or instantaneous events, occurs "when 
the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifest themselves." 337 U.S. at 170. 
In Urie, the Court noted the plaintiff should have known of his injury at least "when he 
became too ill to work." Id. 
Kubrick, which is a Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") case adopted in FELA cases, 
further refined the construction of federal statutes of limitations in the context of a medical 
malpractice case. 444 U.S. at 118-25. The plaintiff knew of his injury and its probable 
cause; he was experiencing a hearing loss and ringing in his ears, and he was told it was 
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"highly possible" the cause was a treatment of neomyacin he received for an infection 
following surgery. The issue was whether "accrual" occurred when the plaintiff knew of his 
injury and its "possible" cause or when he later learned the facts constituting a legal cause 
of action of negligence. Id. at 113-14. The Court stated: 
We thus cannot hold that Congress intended that "accrual" of a claim must await 
awareness by the plaintiff that his injury was negligently inflicted. A plaintiff . . . , 
armed with the facts about the harm done to him, can protect himself by seeking 
advice in the medical and legal community. To excuse him from promptly doing so 
by postponing the accrual of his claim would undermine the purpose of the limitations 
statute.. . . 
Id. at 123 (emphasis added). The Court in Kubrick stated further: 
If he [the plaintiff] fails to bring suit because he is incompetently or mistakenly told 
that he does not have a case, we discern no sound reason for visiting the consequences 
of such error on the defendant by delaying the accrual of the claim until the plaintiff 
is otherwise informed or himself determines to bring su i t . . . . 
Id. at 124. The Court rejected the proposition that a "plaintiff in such cases need not initiate 
a prompt inquiry and would be free to sue at any time within two years from the time he 
receives or perhaps forms for himself a reasonable opinion that he has been wronged." Id. 
at 118 (emphasis added). 
Standing together, Urie and Kubrick mean that "a cause of action accrues for statute 
of limitations purposes when a reasonable person knows or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have known of both the injury and its governing cause." Fries v. Chicago 
& Northwestern Transp. Co.. 909 F.2d 1092,1095 (7th Cir. 1990) (citingNemmers v. United 
States. 795 F.2d 628,629 (7th Cir. 1986); Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Rv. Co.. 773 F.2d 807, 
820-21 (7th Cir. 1985); Drazen v. United States. 762 F.2d 56, 59 (7th Cir. 1985)). The law 
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clearly imposes an affirmative duty on plaintiffs to investigate diligently the potential cause 
of a manifest injury. Id.; see also Tolston v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.. 102 F.3d 863, 865 
(7th Cir. 1996). Moreover, "the injured plaintiff need not be certain which cause, if many 
are possible, is the governing cause but only need know or have reason to know of a potential 
cause." Fries, 909 F.2d at 1095 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see Tolston, 102 F.3d 
at 865. 
Like the case at bar, Fries was an action under the FELA to recover for injuries 
suffered by a railroad worker. 909 F.2d at 1093. Fries, the plaintiff, began to notice a 
decline in his hearing and tinnitus around 1981. Although his hearing problems bothered 
him, he did not seek medical treatment until May 1985. Only then did he happen to learn 
how serious the impairment was and its potential cause. He sued under the FELA in 
November 1987, claiming that the railroad had acted negligently in requiring him to work 
near loud industrial noise and in failing to give him proper protective gear. The Seventh 
Circuit found that Fries' action was time-barred because he failed to fulfill his affirmative 
duty to actively investigate his known injury. Id. at 1097. Applying the rule quoted above, 
the Fries court found that the three year period expired in 1984 or three years after he first 
noticed a decline in his hearing and not when he later chose to seek treatment and 
fortuitously learned of the full nature and potential noise-related cause of his injury. Id. 
In Tolston, the plaintiff filed her FELA claim on April 27, 1995. 102 F.3d at 865. 
She began experiencing knee pain in the late 1970s and early 1980s when she fell several 
times at work. She sought medical attention in 1984 or 1985, received regular treatment 
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beginning in 1985, and underwent knee replacement surgery on May 1, 1992, after falling 
again in late 1990 or early 1991. Id. at 864-65. The court reasoned that a plaintiff has an 
affirmative duty to investigate the cause of a known injury, stating that "[a]t some point, 
persons with degenerative conditions have a duty to investigate cause." Id. at 866 (citation 
omitted). Therefore, the court affirmed summary judgment where Tolston admitted 
experiencing pain in 1989 and failing to investigate the cause. Merely seeking medical 
treatment for her knee pain was not enough to absolve the plaintiff of her responsibility. 
Applying the well-settled law to this case, it is clear Mr. Christiansen's injury had 
manifested itself and Mr. Christiansen had attributed, or at least should have attributed, its 
cause to his employment-related asbestos exposures more than three years before he filed his 
complaint. 
First, the injury obviously had manifested itself. Mr. Christiansen testified he retired 
from his roofing business in 1995 or 1996 because of his continuing and increasing 
symptoms that prevented him from working. Shortly after retiring, Mr. Christiansen applied 
for and received disability benefits based on the same symptoms in his lungs he suffers from 
today. During the application process in 1995, he told a doctor his symptoms began five 
years earlier. Again, in 2002, he told a separate doctor that his symptoms began ten to fifteen 
years earlier. Therefore, it is clear from the record that Mr. Christiansen's illness manifested 
itself prior to January 9, 1999 and outside the statute of limitations. Mr. Christiansen does 
not appear to dispute this fact. 
Second, Mr. Christiansen also knew that at least a possible cause of his injury was the 
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asbestos exposures he believed he had from his work. This conclusion was not a mere 
suspicion without any basis. He stated that he personally linked his illness, as well as the 
similar illnesses of many of his former pipeline coworkers, to asbestos. He knew around the 
time of his retirement that many of his former pipeline coworkers, also exposed to asbestos, 
suffered the same symptoms. He stated that because of these facts he knew in the back of 
his mind that asbestos was causing his symptoms. 
Mr. Christiansen also had knowledge of additional facts that logically supported his 
conclusion. He conceded knowing that the asbestos products he had worked with were 
hazardous, and therefore capable of causing some harm. In fact, before he retired, he knew 
asbestos-containing roofing products were being regulated by the government and replaced 
with non-asbestos-containing products by manufacturers. Asbestos was being taken out of 
schools. Mr. Christiansen had a reasonable basis to conclude that his exposures to hazardous 
asbestos was the cause of his illness that caused him to retire. 
Mr. Christiansen points to his deposition testimony where he said he thought for "the 
last couple years" that asbestos caused his illness. (R. 579.) Were it not for Mr. 
Christiansen's other statements, that comment would be confusing because a "couple" merely 
means "an indefinite small number" (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 298 
(1988)), and because the comment was unrelated to the subject matter of the questioning at 
the time it was made. Instead, Mr. Christiansen's clear statement that he concluded asbestos 
caused his illness controls because it was made in direct response to questions on the matter. 
He stated: 
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Q. So, at least for some period of time before you retired, you had an 
understanding that exposure to asbestos could be harmful? 
A. Why, certainly. Everybody did. They was pulling it out of the schools. They 
was pulling it out of the attics and stuff. From that point on, I was real leery 
of it. Everybody was leery of it. (R. 684 (emphasis added).) 
* * * 
Q. And again, just to make sure you're clear, I'm not asking you to tell me 
medically what their condition is or what the cause is. I'm only asking for, 
in your mind, when you made a connection or a link between their work 
exposures and their problems and their death. 
A. Oh, it's been quite sometime since we - - since, at least since I decided in 
my own mind the connection to asbestos. It's been a while back since - -
Q. Before your retirement or after your retirement? 
A. About the time of my retirement. It - -1 just got to thinking, you know, 
they've done all these tests, and they can't, couldn't do nothing for me. 
And every doctor I went to would come up with something else, something 
else, treat me for something else. They done no good. And when they 
didn't do me no good, they'd kick me to another doctor. You've probably 
got a file this deep on all the doctors I've been to and stuff. And I kind of 
knew in my own mind what was causing it. But the doctors, they want to 
check you out for what they specialize in. 
Q. And what you were thinking in your own mind was those exposures to 
asbestos in the workplace? 
A. Yeah. Uh huh. (R. 697-88 (emphasis added).) 
* * * 
Q. So, it's your understanding he told you that the pain that you were asked 
about this morning was caused by this asbestosis? 
A. Yeah. Yeah. And he told me that they had medicines and pills and stuff 
that they could contain it, but not help it. 
Q. Was that a surprise to you? 
A. No, didn't surprise me a bit. It just confirmed what I had thought for quite a 
while. (R. 690 (emphasis added).) 
Therefore, it is undisputed that Mr. Christiansen concluded before January 9, 1999 that 
asbestos caused the illness he had been suffering for many years before then. It is further 
undisputed that he had a reasonable basis in fact for his personal knowledge. 
Third, and alternatively, even if Mr. Christiansen had not reasonably known at the 
time of his retirement that asbestos was the cause of the illness that was causing him to retire, 
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as he expressly testified, he certainly should have obtained that knowledge through a diligent 
investigation of the nature and cause of his illness. Nothing prevented Mr. Christiansen from 
going to Dr. Scholand and Dr. Berensen, or some other "asbestos doctor," in 1995 to explore 
the cause of his illness. If he had not already had good reason to know for himself that 
asbestos was the cause, any reasonable person would have gone to an "asbestos doctor" to 
have fully evaluated the mere suspicion of asbestos as a cause. Mr. Christiansen simply did 
not care what caused his illness; he only sought treatment. He admits going to other doctors 
but only for treatment, not to determine if he had a claim for his illness. 
Further evidencing his lack of diligence in investigating for a cause, he never sought 
legal advice. Nothing prevented Mr. Christiansen from going to a lawyer in 1995. He admits 
taking the legal action of obtaining social security disability benefits. He was satisfied with 
those benefits. Mr. Christiansen admits he only sought legal advise when he did, not because 
he was not sick earlier and not because of his later asbestos-related diagnosis, but only 
because he had become disgusted with the long lasting progression of the symptoms of his 
illness. (R. 653.) 
Certainly there is no evidence that UPRR did anything to prevent Mr. Christiansen 
from promptly seeking or obtaining appropriate medical advice on whether asbestos was a 
cause, assuming he had no reasonable basis for his own knowledge, or from seeking legal 
assistance earlier than he did. Also, there is no evidence that had Mr. Christiansen promptly 
and actively sought medical advice and legal assistance on the nature and cause of his illness 
and on the existence of a claim, that he could not have brought an FELA asbestos claim 
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within three years of when his illness became manifest. Under the objective standard of the 
law, Mr. Christiansen at least should have known that asbestos was a possible cause of his 
illness because of his legal duty to diligently investigate and ability to learn through a diligent 
investigation of the asbestos-related cause he now alleges. 
Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
because Mr. Christiansen "knew or reasonably should have known of both his injury and its 
cause by the mid-1990's," if not earlier, and at least before January 9, 1999. (R. 887). 
B. Mr. Christiansen's Incorrect Analysis 
Turning to Mr. Christiansen's arguments on appeal, it should be clear to this Court 
that the fact Mr. Christiansen eventually happened to go to an "asbestos doctor" and obtain 
an asbestosis diagnosis does not create an issue of material fact. Mr. Christiansen merely 
was seeking treatment, not actively investigating any mere suspicion or even further 
confirming his own reasoned conclusion that he had an asbestos-related illness. Through the 
course of seeking treatment, he happened to go to "asbestos doctors" who he states diagnosed 
that he had asbestosis that was causing his pain. That occurred, if at all, after his action was 
commenced, not before. Yet if it had been before, the fortuitous circumstances of such a 
diagnosis cannot be relevant. The law holds Mr. Christiansen to his reasoned conclusion and 
also, should he have not reached his conclusion, imposes the duty to diligently investigate 
the causes of, not just obtain treatment for, his injury for the purpose of determining whether 
he had an FELA cause of action. At a minimum, Mr. Christiansen had a duty to diligently 
inquire of both the "medical and legal community." Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123. He did 
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neither, and the law does not allow him to sit on his hands until a diagnosis falls into his lap 
because that is not what a reasonable person with a manifest injury would do to protect his 
or her legal rights to bring a claim. The need to diligently investigate the cause of a known 
injury is even more compelling should that person have a mere suspicion of the cause that 
has not yet developed into a reasoned conclusion. 
In addition to the case authority previously discussed, two cases cited by Mr. 
Christiansen state the law on this point which completely undermines Mr. Christiansen's 
analysis. In Kronisch v. United States. 150 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998), the court stated that 
"suspicions do give rise to a duty to inquire into the possible existence of a claim in the 
exercise of due diligence." Id. at 121 (citations omitted). That court also explained: 
Discovery of the "critical facts" of injury and causation is not an exacting 
requirement, but requires only knowledge of, or knowledge that could lead to, the 
basic facts of the injury, Le., knowledge of the injury's existence and knowledge of 
its cause or of the person or entity that inflicted i t . . .. [A] plaintiff need not know 
each and every relevant fact of his injury or even that the injury implicates a 
cognizable legal claim. Rather, a claim will accrue when the plaintiff knows, or 
should know, enough of the critical facts of injury and causation to protect himself by 
seeking legal advice. [Citations omitted.] 
Id. The court in Garza v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 284 F.3d 930, 935 (8th Cir. 
2002), also cited by Mr. Christiansen, further explained: 
[A] plaintiffs assertion of when he gained actual knowledge is not determinative if 
he did not act reasonably and, "in effect, closed [his] eyes to evident and objective 
facts concerning accrual of [his] right to sue." [Citation omitted.] 
In both cases, the summary dismissal of time-barred FTC A cases was affirmed. 
Mr. Christiansen's argument that his personal knowledge is insufficient for accrual 
to occur without a medical diagnosis also misstates the law. As discussed above, the law 
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clearly provides that accrual occurs upon the plaintiff's knowledge of an injury and its cause, 
not when the plaintiff happens to obtain medical or legal confirmation. Mr. Christiansen not 
only knew of his injury, but upon the basis of other existing facts, he reasonably concluded 
and therefore also knew of the alleged asbestos cause of his injury. Under the law, he had 
knowledge of his injury and its cause sufficient for the running of the statute of limitations. 
He had sufficient notice to know he needed to act to protect his legal rights, should he have 
wanted to do so. 
The law further provides, upon an objective standard as Mr. Christiansen agrees, that 
a reasonable person with a known injury only suspected to be caused by asbestos (not a 
reasoned conclusion) would actively seek appropriate medical advice specifically to obtain 
a basis for the suspicion as well as legal advice to preserve any claim. The fact that Mr. 
Christiansen also knew asbestos to be harmful only further shows that a failure to seek such 
medical and legal advice is undeniably unreasonable. The truth is Mr. Christiansen did not 
care about pursuing a claim for an asbestos-related injury until it was too late. Mr. 
Christiansen admitted he finally sought legal advice only because of the worsening of his 
symptoms, not because he did not previously know he had an illness or its cause. He did not 
state that the asbestosis diagnosis (that actually occurred after the commencement of this 
action) caused him to seek legal advice and bring his action. 
Upon the Court's understanding of the true importance of Mr. Christiansen's personal 
knowledge that asbestos caused his illness, Mr. Christiansen's "bad policy" argument is seen 
to be only a smoke screen. He contends that if a plaintiff has to file a lawsuit with only a 
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subjective belief on the cause of an illness then either the lawsuit will be without merit (filed 
by lawyers only to somehow avoid malpractice) or without evidence. This position is 
predicated on a firm diagnosis being necessary to have merit and evidence. This is a smoke 
screen intended to hide the fundamental truth that the law does not require a lawsuit to be 
filed on only an unreasoned belief without any other effort by the injured person. 
A potential plaintiff with personal knowledge of an injury and its cause, or with only 
a mere suspicion of the cause, is not allowed to do nothing, but instead has three years to 
obtain assistance in fully evaluating and bringing a claim. This is no different than accrual 
upon the occurrence of a traumatic event. Should a train strike a worker, that worker has 
three years to obtain any medical evidence and an attorney to evaluate whether an FELA 
negligence claim is warranted. Congress has not determined that more time is needed for 
manifest toxic exposure injuries than for traumatic injuries. The point is that the potential 
plaintiff who has reason to believe his rights have been invaded cannot sit on those rights 
until something happens to compel him or her into action, without risking the possibility that 
nothing may happen until after the three years has expired, as what occurred in the instant 
case. 
Now on appeal, in order to excuse his lack of any effort to seek assistance on whether 
he had a claim, Mr. Christiansen slides in an incorrect argument that must be corrected. He 
states for the first time in this case that perhaps his asbestosis had not "yet developed" to the 
point where the medical community could diagnosis it until he happened to receive that 
diagnosis. His suggestion is factually unsupported. Asbestosis is not a new disease. It has 
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been recognized for decades. See W. RAYMOND PARKES, OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISORDERS 
248-65 (2d Ed. 1982) (included in the Appendix). There is no medical evidence of record 
that any doctor has opined, at any time, that Mr. Christiansen's asbestosis could not have 
been diagnosed before January 9,1999, especially in light of Mr. Christiansen's long lasting 
symptoms and historical exposures to asbestos. 
There is no reason to speculate that the purported asbestosis diagnosis of Drs. 
Scholand and Berensen in 2002 could not have been made before 1999. The fact of the 
matter is they were not approached by Mr. Christiansen until late 2002. Before then he only 
went to other doctors for treatment. There is no evidence those "treating doctors" had all the 
qualifications of and did all the testing done by the "asbestos doctors," Drs. Scholand and 
Berensen. There is no basis to conclude that Mr. Christiansen ever was told that medical 
science could not support his conclusion or that he was dissuaded from his own conclusion 
that asbestos was the cause of his illness. When he was told he had asbestosis, he was not 
surprised. Mr. Christiansen's new argument should be rejected as late and without factual 
merit. 
Accrual cannot depend on a fortuitous confirmation of an already existing, reasonably 
formed conclusion not diligently investigated and never discussed with a legal advisor. Mr. 
Christiansen's case authority certainly does not stand for the proposition he advances that the 
running of the FELA statute of limitations is tolled until an eventual plaintiff merely happens 
to receive a favorable diagnosis while seeking treatment. Mr. Christiansen cites to Urie and 
Kubrick as governing law, but Mr. Christiansen then fails to apply the principles from those 
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United States Supreme Court cases. Instead, he reaches afar to find pre-Kubrick, non-FELA 
and state law cases whose facts can be easily distinguished from the case at bar or whose 
legal analyses apply non-controlling state law. 
Mr. Christiansen cites to Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980), an 
FTC A case where the statute of limitations did not begin to run until diagnosis because the 
plaintiffs illness was new to science. Id. at 1270-71. The Stoleson court noted, "had [the 
plaintiff] sought competent legal advice, she would have been informed quite correctly that 
she had no claim against the Government" because the medical community did not recognize 
her illness. Id. at 1270. Not only her own physicians, but her employer's physicians, 
correctly informed her that the state of medical knowledge did not support her mere suspicion 
that a particular work place exposure to nitroglycerin caused her heart problems. Indeed, all 
she had was a baseless suspicion. Id. at 1266-67. A reasonable basis for that suspicion 
existed only later when a Dr. Lange published a seminal article documenting for the very first 
time a causal relation between angina and workers exposed to nitroglycerin. Id. at 1267, 
1270. Before medical science recognized the causal connection, she was powerless to obtain 
any basis for her mere suspicion. She "remained a prisoner within the walls of medical 
science." Id. at 1269-70. It was not Dr. Lange's mere diagnosis pertaining to the plaintiff, 
in a vacuum, that ripened the plaintiffs suspicion into knowledge of causation sufficient for 
accrual to occur, it was his conclusion that the plaintiff fit a diagnosis that until the previous 
month had not been recognized. Id. at 1270-71. In the instant case, as has been shown, 
asbestosis was recognized before the 1990s. In addition, it is significant that, unlike Mr. 
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Christiansen, the plaintiff in the Stoleson case "acted with utmost diligence in seeking to 
establish the cause of her heart problems" which led her to Dr. Lange. Id. at 1271. 
He also cites to Young v. Clinchfield R. Co., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961). In Young, 
the defendant argued that there was an issue of fact on when accrual occurred. That position 
was rejected. The defendant's argument went too far. The plaintiff had a plethora of 
ailments with various symptoms, including shortness of breath. Id. at 503. The defendant 
argued that because the plaintiff lived in a mining region where silicosis was fairly common, 
he should have suspected his shortness of breath was caused by exposure to silica rather than 
his other ailments. This argument required a conclusion that because of where he lived he 
should be charged with knowing that shortness of breath was a symptom of silicosis. In 
rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that living in West Virginia does not vest all 
residents with expert knowledge or diagnostic skill, and shortness of breath is not unique to 
silicosis. Where the plaintiff had no knowledge or mere suspicion that he had silicosis until 
he was diagnosed, there could be no issue of fact that he should have known of that injury 
and its cause. Id. In the instance case, Mr. Christiansen had knowledge, and at least a 
suspicion, of an invasion of his legal rights from exposures to asbestos. Moreover, it should 
not be overlooked that the Young case pre-dates Kubrick by nearly twenty years, and there 
was no analysis of the plaintiffs duty to diligently investigate the cause of manifest 
symptoms in conjunction with the Kubrick holding that incorrect medical advice is born by 
the plaintiff not the defendant through additional tolling. E.g., Pinczkowski v. Norfolk S. Ry. 
Co., 571 S.E.2d 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (expressly distinguishes the Young case in Kubrick-
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type analysis that led to the holding that that action was time-barred when symptoms of 
asbestosis became manifest yet the plaintiff did not diligently investigate his belief pertaining 
to asbestos as the cause, and instead waited until his asbestosis happened to be diagnosed). 
In Aerojet-General Shipyards, Inc. v. O'Keeffe. 413 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. 1969), 
also cited by Mr. Christiansen, accrual under the FELA, or FTC A, was not at issue. At issue 
was the timeliness of a claim for worker's compensation under the Longshoreman's and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). The LHWCA is not the equivalent of the 
FELA. It is not a negligence statute. Compensation is a right if a claim is timely filed from 
when the employee knows or should know an occupational disease arose out of the 
employment. That court expressly held that under the LHWCA the "effects must manifest 
themselves to a physician rather than to an unschooled employee before limitations begin to 
run." Id. at 796. That is not the law set down in Urie. The Aerojet court erroneously cites 
Urie in a footnote for the purported proposition that "the statute of limitations could only 
begin to run when the employee has definite knowledge that his injury or disease is work-
related." Id. at n.4 (emphasis added). No such holding was made in Urie. The Aerojet 
ruling also pre-dates Kubrick and includes no analysis of the FELA worker's duty to 
diligently investigate mere suspicions of what caused an injury. There is no analysis of the 
effect of incorrect medical opinions and legal advice. Cf, Emmons v. S. Pac. Transp. Co.. 
701 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1983) (distinguishes Aerojet, in a holding that affirms dismissal of 
FELA action for untimeliness, even without a Kubrick analysis, because the plaintiff was not 
dissuaded from his personal belief about causation before the diagnosis). 
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Mr. Christiansen also discusses Harrison v. United States. 708 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 
1983) which is an FTCA medical malpractice case. It also is factually distinguishable. In 
Harrison, the plaintiffs negligent doctors withheld medical evidence; thus, their mistakes, 
the cause of her illness, was hidden by the defendant. Id. at 1024-27. In addition, in its 
discussion of the law, this case destroys Mr. Christiansen's position. It clearly explains that 
the standard only is knowledge of facts that would lead a "reasonable person," not a 
physician, to conclude that there was a causal connection or of facts that would lead a 
"reasonable person" to seek professional advice and with such advice then conclude there 
was a causal connection. Id- at 1027. It is explained that a belief that is reasonably based on 
something is the same as knowledge. Id. The plaintiff in Harrison had no way of obtaining 
a basis for her mere suspicion that malpractice caused her symptoms until the medical 
evidence, hidden by the defendant, finally was discovered because of her diligent efforts in 
seeking a basis for her mere suspicion. This case is vastly different from the case at bar. 
Mr. Christiansen also cites to Loughlin v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D. D.C. 
2002), another FTCA case. He points out that the plaintiffs did seek to determine the facts 
regarding whether the defendant had buried toxic substances on their property. Indeed that 
court expressly stated: 
[A] claimant may not wait passively until evidence of actual injury surfaces. "Once 
the prospective plaintiff is on notice that it might have a claim, it is required to make 
a diligent inquiry into the facts and circumstances that would support that claim." 
[Citation omitted.] 
Id. at 40. At issue was the evidence pertaining to the practicality of discovering the injury 
- namely the contamination to real property. That evidence created an issue of fact on 
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whether reasonable diligence could have discovered the injury at the time the defendant 
claims. The court held that a reasonable jury could conclude the contamination was known 
or should have been known only within the limitation period. Id. at 40-44. That case is 
extremely fact intensive which does not allow its ruling to have broad application. It has not 
been cited in any subsequent case grappling with the application of a federal statute of 
limitations. 
The court in Maughan v. SW Servicing. Inc.. 758 F.2d 1381,1385 (10th Cir. 1985), 
also raised by Mr. Christiansen, applied the discovery rule to cancer cases brought under 
state law because "exceptional circumstances" warranted it. The dispute in the present case 
is not whether the discovery rule applies; it does. The applicable discovery rule is, however, 
the one set out in Urie and Kubrick rather than the particular state law rule discussed in 
Maughan. 
Likewise, Mr. Christiansen mistakenly relies upon the state court case of Keller v. 
Armstrong World Indus.. Inc., 107 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). However factually similar 
to the case at bar, Keller is legally irrelevant. The Oregon Court of Appeals established the 
test for when the statute of limitations begins to run under its state products liability law. Id. 
at 33-40. Specifically, it determined the test for when the plaintiff "discovered" his disease 
or injuries which, under Oregon law, is the date the injury accrued. The standard established 
in Keller is more stringent than federal law applicable to FELA cases. The court applied a 
"substantial possibility" test, which states that "a plaintiff must have an awareness of facts 
that indicate the existence of his or her disease arid its cause with a considerable degree of 
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likelihood in order for the statute of limitations to be triggered." Keller, 107 P.3d at 36 
(emphasis added). Likewise, the court interpreted "discovery" in the statute's text to require 
a high degree of certainty. Id. Therefore, even though Keller presents an interesting 
academic comparison between Oregon state law and the FELA, it is not federal law and is 
not relevant to the dispute here. 
This Court must apply federal law as it has been interpreted by federal courts, 
beginning with the United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court 
expressly so held in Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1951), by stating that: 
State laws are not controlling in determining what the incidents of [the FELA] shall 
be. [Citations omitted.] Manifestly the federal rights affording relief to injured 
railroad employees under a federally declared standard could be defeated if states 
were permitted to have the final say as to what defenses could and could not be 
properly interposed to suits under the Act. Moreover, only if federal law controls can 
the federal Act be given that uniform application throughout the country essential to 
effectuate its purposes. [Citations omitted.] 
Id. at 361. See also Scarborough v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 202 F.2d 84, 87 (4th Cir. 1953) 
("The Dice case also makes two other points crystal clear. One point is that, as to the 
avoidance of the statute of limitations, the federal law governs, not the State law"); 
Whitmarsh v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F. Supp. 850, 852 (E.D. Penn. 1945) ("First, a word 
may be said about the applicable law. Plaintiffs suit rests on asserted rights granted by 
federal laws which, it is well settled, require uniform interpretation, so that local law is 
inapplicable."); Burlington N. R. Co. v. Warren. 574 So.2d 758,763 (Ala. 1990) ("The rights 
and obligations of parties to an FELA action are determined by applicable principles of law 
as interpreted and applied in federal courts."). Even this very Court previously recognized 
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that federal law governs substantive issues pertaining to the FELA. Handy v. Union Pac. R. 
Co., 841 P.2d 1210,1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Mr. Christiansen is wrong in implying that 
this Court can look to state law in Utah or elsewhere. 
Mr. Christiansen has provided no case authority supporting his erroneous arguments 
and analysis. 
C. Conclusion 
The trial court applied the proper objective standard when finding Mr. Christiansen 
knew (had reasonably supported beliefs), or at least reasonably should have known through 
a diligent investigation in the medical and legal community, both of his injury and the alleged 
asbestos-related cause. The record is undisputed that Mr. Christiansen's injury manifested 
itself no later than the mid-1990s. It forced him to retire. It is also undisputed that Mr. 
Christiansen then knew asbestos was hazardous, that he and his co-workers had been exposed 
to it, and that many of them who also were exposed to asbestos suffered from his same 
symptoms. He then knew measures were being taken to remove asbestos from roofing 
products and schools. Mr. Christiansen personally knew, with this reasonable basis for his 
conclusion, that asbestos was the cause of his illness. At a minimum, should he only have 
had an unsupported suspicion, he could and should have diligently investigated that suspicion 
in the medical and legal community within three years. Therefore, the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment because there are no disputed issues of material fact with regard 
to whether Mr. Christiansen knew or should have known both of his injury and its alleged 
asbestos-related cause years before January 9, 1999. 
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H. MR. CHRISTIANSEN ALSO FAILED TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF AN FELA 
DUTY THAT UPRR BREACHED. 
The FELA allows employees to recover for injuries resulting from the negligence of 
their railroad employers. 45 U.S.C. $51: Urie v. Thompson. 337 U.S. 163,178(1949). U[A] 
plaintiff still must prove all of the elements of employer negligence: duty, breach, 
foreseeability, and causation " Handy v. Union Pac. R. Co.. 841 P.2d at 1210, 1219 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). It is not a workers' compensation statute, and it does not "render the 
employer the insurer of the employee's safety." Id. at 1215. "FELA does not impose strict 
liability on employers." Id- at 1215. Naturally, when a plaintiff fails to produce evidence 
supporting his claim, the action fails as a matter of law. Id. at 1220. Mr. Christiansen failed 
to produce evidence sufficient to establish all the elements of negligence. Consequently, his 
claim must fail as a matter of law. 
The party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise . . . 
[permitted], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(e). Upon the basis of the above-cited authority, without knowing or being able 
to discover the alleged hazard, the defendant cannot be faulted for not addressing such a 
hazard, even if it really existed. Thus, as expressly stated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Urie, a legal duty under the FELA exists only where there is evidence to prove the 
employer "knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known, that prevalent standards 
of conduct were inadequate to protect [the employee]." 337 U.S. at 178 (quotations omitted). 
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See also Handy, 841 P.2d at 1220 (The plaintiff must "prove defendant either knew or 
reasonably should have known that the working conditions . . . would or reasonably might 
produce harm to its employees . . .."). Mr. Christiansen has not set forth specific facts 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial on the elements of foreseeability, duty and breach. 
Mr. Christiansen alleges that he was exposed to inhaleable asbestos when he worked 
for UPRR. He has testified as to his mere belief that he was around some products that 
contained asbestos. He has produced evidence, through Mr. Cohen's affidavit, that UPRR 
was aware of some unidentified hazard from asbestos exposures that could be rectified with 
unidentified "control practices." What is lacking is any evidence that Mr. Christiansen had 
exposures to actual asbestos that fell within the unidentified hazard supposedly known by 
UPRR, and if so, that the unidentified control practices also were not then in place. Stated 
more simply, what is lacking is any evidence that the level of Mr. Christiansen's alleged 
exposures, if any, were known or even should have been known by UPRR to be hazardous. 
There must be evidence that before 1951, Mr. Christiansen's employment date, UPRR 
knew or should have known that employees doing what Mr. Christiansen did would be 
exposed to a level of asbestos that would or reasonably might cause some harm. There is no 
evidence of any actual exposures let alone the level of such exposures. There is no evidence 
that level, whatever it was, was known or could be known, at that time, to be hazardous to 
Mr. Christiansen when he was at work performing his job duties. Mr. Christiansen certainly 
did not testify of the level of asbestos to which he believes he may have been exposed. 
Neither does Mr. Cohen. Neither witness has even attempted to state what level of exposure 
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was believed before 1951 to be hazardous. 
Not only does Mr. Cohen's affidavit fail to fill this void, it is inadmissible and should 
not even be considered. "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, [and] shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence " Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(e). Factually unsupported conclusions are insufficient whether made by either 
experts or nonexperts. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97,103 (Utah 1992). The Supreme 
Court of Utah has stressed "the requirement that rule 56(e) requires specific facts . . . [and] 
a bare assertion that the expert has reviewed the facts and based his or her opinion on them 
will not suffice." Id. at 104 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Conclusory opinions 
without foundation are inadmissible. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). 
An affidavit deficient for these reasons cannot create an issue of fact. 
The affidavit of Ken Cohen is not admissible because it contains conclusory opinions, 
especially about UPRR's purported knowledge, that are made without adequate foundation. 
The necessary "specific" facts are missing. Mr. Cohen's opinions were not based on the facts 
of this case. He does not purport to know anything about Mr. Christiansen's exposures to 
actual asbestos. He did not review Mr. Christiansen's work history, medical history, 
deposition, or any other evidence. The other case, to which Mr. Cohen's affidavit applies, 
concerned a UPRR employee in Utah who had a completely different job. Therefore, the 
affidavit lacks the proper foundation for Mr. Cohen to opine on the fact or level of Mr. 
Christiansen's alleged asbestos exposures in 1951 in Pocatello. Consequently, Mr. 
Christiansen conceded that the affidavit was not submitted for that purpose. 
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Also, the opinion about UPRR's purported knowledge of some unidentified hazard 
lacks foundation. In violation of the Butterfield standard, Mr. Cohen only states he has 
reviewed literature, notes and reports. The specific literature, notes and reports are not 
identified, nor what they state or contain. Mr. Cohen does not state the "specific" facts for 
his opinion or even what particular hazard was known and what "specific" recommendations 
for control practices were made. What class of employees, if any, were at risk of any such 
hazard without the control practices? What specific job duties would put an employee at risk 
of some harm? What specific facts support any opinion pertaining to UPRR's purported 
knowledge of any particular answer to these questions? The affidavit simply lacks the proper 
foundation for Mr. Cohen to opine on any hazard that would be relevant to Mr. Christiansen. 
Moreover, there is no context for Mr. Cohen's opinions. Consequently, his opinions also are 
immaterial. They cannot create a genuine issue of material fact in order to preclude the 
granting of summary judgment. 
Mr. Christiansen's position boils down to this: UPRR is liable merely because Mr. 
Christiansen believed asbestos-containing products were used by UPRR on steam 
locomotives, Mr. Christiansen worked with or around such products, and Mr. Christiansen 
sustained an asbestos-related disease. This is the most that can be inferred upon the evidence 
of record construed most favorably for him. However, these facts do not address reasonable 
foreseeability necessary for there to have been any particular duty in 1951. His claim against 
UPRR must be dismissed on the merits because, even with Mr. Cohen's affidavit, it is not 
established that a material duty existed that could be shown to be breached in the case of Mr. 
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Christiansen's assumed exposures. Therefore, this Court should correct the error of the trial 
court when it determined Mr. Christiansen established a duty and could show UPRR 
breached that duty. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, UPRR respectfully requests that this Court (1) affirm the 
trial court's ruling that Mr. Christiansen's claim is time-barred and (2) reverse the trial 
court's ruling that there was sufficient evidence to establish a duty and show breach of that 
duty by UPRR. UPRR also requests its costs on appeal. 
DATED this 17th day of August, 2005 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
E. Scott Savage 
Casey K. McGarvey 
Attorneys f©r Union Pacific Railroad Company 
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RtCEIVED 
MAY 0 8 2001 
E1SENBERG& GILCHRIST 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - . , _ - B | S T R | C T Q 0 U H T 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ™ r d J U d i C 'a l D t a t r * 
AY - 7 2001 
LAKEVOUNTY 
IN RE ASBESTOS LITIGATION 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER No. 1 
Case No. 010900863 AS 
Judge Glenn K. Twasaki 
Based upon representations by various potential plaintiffs3 counsel to the judges of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. Utah, this Order is entered in anticipation of a 
substantial increase in asbestos litigation in Utah courts. 
This Order is intended to facilitate the administration of those cases involving allegations 
of asbestos exposure by reducing multiple filings and hearings and by setting out orders for the 
orderly disposition of such cases. This Order shall apply to all cases filed by Eisenberg & 
Gilchrist and Durham, Jones & Pinegar in which a claim for money damages is based on 
allegations of exposure to products containing asbestos and/or machinery., calling .for the use of 
asbestos (hereinafter referred to as "asbestos cases"). 
1 
GENERAL PROCEDURES 
1. Cover Sheet: A cover sheet shall be filed with each pleading. The cover sheet shall 
list the party filing the pleading and its counsel; it shall also list in a vertical column all other 
parties. 
2. Master Service List: Plaintiffs counsel shall maintain a master service list of all 
counsel representing parties in any asbestos case governed by this Order. Defense counsel shall. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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V 
e-mail their addresses to plaintiffs' counsel at the time they enter their appearance. An updated 
copy of this master service-list will also be filed in the offices.of Judge Iwasaki. It is the 
responsibility of all parties to ensure that the current master service list, as updated, is used for 
the service of all master pleadings. 
3. Service of Pleadings and Documents: Any party required to serve any notice in an 
asbestos case shall serve one copy of the document on counsel for each party as they appear on 
the service list for that individual case and file, and file it with the Court as appropriate. 
a. The parties may stipulate to service of any pleading, discovery document, or 
other written materials by e-mail (hereinafter referred to as "e-service") in lieu of standard 
service by mail or hand delivery, and are encouraged to do so. Such e-service shall be deemed 
the same as service by hand delivery for computing time to file a response. 
b. No party will be deemed bound by e-service/unless it has affhmatively stated 
that it will agree to such service in writing, but if such an election is made by a party, in one case, 
it will be deemed effective in all cases until expressly rejected in writing. Also, if an attorney 
stipulates to. e-service on behalf of one client s/he will be expected to accept e-service for all . . 
his/her clients. Parties may reject a prior e-service-agreement if such an election is not made. 
4. Status of Service of Process: At the timer-Initial Disclosures^* plamtrffare-due- -• - - • 
plaintiffs0 counsel shall provide a list of all parties who have been served to date and their 
attorneys. The Certificate of Service on the Initial Disclosures is sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement. Defendants shall have forty-five (45) days from the date of proper service in which 
to file an Answer or otherwise plead. 
5.' Rules of Civil Procedure: The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all asbestos 
cases except to the extent that those rules are modified by this Case Management Order. 
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6. Master Pleadings: It is hereby ordered that an action entitled In re: Asbestos 
Litigation, Master Case No. 010900863. AS, shall become the Master case for all cases involving-
exposure to asbestos-containing products. This Master Asbestos Case shall serve as a depository 
for all asbestos pleadings, discovery matters, motions, orders and other documents.common to all 
asbestos liability actions. Pleadings, discovery matters, motions, orders, exhibit and witness 
lists, pre-trial statements and other documents common to all cases shall be filed only in the 
Master Asbestos Case and not in any individual case. When counsel enters an appearance for the 
first time for a particular defendant; s/he should file his/her notice of appearance in the Master 
Asbestos Case. Counsel are thereafter required to notify the Clerk of Court of all changes in 
their address, telephone numbers, and fax numbers. 
a. In each case, the.parties may, if they wish, incorporate by reference any 
specifically described master pleading, whether that master pleading is filed by that party or by 
any other party; . • : 
b. Plaintiff s counsel should file a Master Complaint and then incorporate it by 
reference in a brief complaint filed on behalf of each individual plaintiff; 
c. Defendants are encouraged to file a Master Answer and to incorporate it by 
reference in answering the individual complaint filed on behalf of each .plaintiff; 
d. Any party shall have the right to move against or contest any master pleading 
as though that master pleading were filed in an individual case. 
7. Attribution of Fault: Until further order of the Court, defendants are presumed to have 
no cross-claims against one another for contribution, indemnity or allocation of fault. However, 
consistent with §78-37-41,. Utah. CodeAnno., each defendant will notify plaintiffs' counsel, by 
the date set in the attorney's planning meeting or upon further order of the court, of the identity Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of those non-party defendants it intends to place on the jury verdict form for purposes of the 
allocation of fault . . • . . ' . . . 
8. Pro Hac Vice Admissions: 
a. Motion for admission; When local counsel seeks a first time association and 
admission of an out-of-state attorney, local counsel shall present Judge Iwasaki with an ex-parte 
motion and related paperwork that shall fully comply with all requirements of Utah law. The 
motion shall be filed in the master oase file, bearing the case number noted on this Case 
Management Order. 
b. Scope of order: An order admitting counsel pro hac vice in a Salt Lake County 
asbestos exposure case shall provide that it is effective in all then pending actions and shall be 
effective in any future actions filed in Salt Lake County alleging damages from asbestos 
exposure. Once an out-of-state attorney has been admitted in any case pursuant to this Case 
Management Order, local counsel need only file a copy of the order admitting that counsel in any 
other asbestos-related case in which the out-of-state attorney wishes to appear. 
c. Notice of changes: Local counsel and an out-of-state attorney admitted pro hac 
vice shall promptly notify the Court of any changes in the out-of-state attorney's bar admission 
status. ... . . _ „ . . . : . . ... . ..,,.. _., 
d. Timing of Filings: Orders for admission^ro hac vice may be filed at any time 
prior to the last judicial day before trial. Motions for admission pro hac vice or related orders 
made subsequent to that time will be granted only for good cause shown. 
9. Non-waiver of Rights: By entry of this Case Management Order, the parties have not -
waived any of their rights including, but not limited to, the right to contest joinder, jurisdiction, 
or venue, or the right to seek removal to federal court. Moreover, the parties have not waived 
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their rights to assert or contest the manner in which these cases should be tried nor have the 
parties waived their rights to seek modifications of this order in individual cases upon motion-
and for good cause shown. 
10. Preservation of Privileges: The joint defense privilege and the common interest 
privilege are preserved to the extent allowed under the law of Utah and, by conferring or meeting 
or exchanging documents, defendants have not waived any attorney/client or work product 
privilege. 
11. Amendment of Case Management Order: For good cause shown, any party may 
move, or the Court may act on its own motion, to amend this Case Management Order. 
12. Severance of Punitive Damages: The Court has taken the issue of whether to sever 
any claims for punitive damages" firoin the compensatory damages under advisement. 
DISCOVERY: INITIAL PHASE 
1. Initial Disclosures: No later that 60 days after the filing of the complaint or entry of 
this Case Management Order, which is later, plaintiff shall serve his/her Initial Disclosures. 
2. Authorization for Obtaining Records: -Simultaneous with the filing and service-of the -
initial disclosures, plaintiff will provide to an attorney-designated by defense counsel signed 
original authorizations to enable defendants to obtain medical records, VA records, union 
records, income tax records, Social Security earnings records, Social Security disability records, 
Social Security Printouts, military records, worker's compensation records, and past or present 
employers'personnel records. • 
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.. .a. These authorizations are for documents, pathology materials, and original 
radiological films and are not to be construed to authorize verbal communications that are not 
otherwise allowable. ' 
b. The records described in this paragraph 2 of Section II, which are produced by 
any party pursuant to these authorizations, are determined by the court to be authentic under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, unless specific objection is made thereto at least thirty (30) days 
prior to trial. 
c. These records are not to be filed with the court. 
d. The attorney designated by defendants to receive the authorizations shall make 
a complete copy of all records obtained pursuant to these authorizations available to plaintiffs 
counsel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3. Defendants' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents: No ; 
later than one-hundred-twenty (120) days after the filing of the complaint, or entry of this Case 
Management Order, whichever is later, plaintiff shall serve a copy of the plaintiffs responses to 
Defendants1 Master Interrogatories.and Requests for Production of Documents, together with a 
copy of the requested documents. The Ma^^Megpgatqii^s a^R^^cste fm Production are 
deemed served at the time plaintiff files his/her complaint. ..", <~ •-.- •.-,. • / . . - : . . . . 
4. Defendants3 Initial Disclosures: No later than thirty (30) days after filing its answer, 
each defendant shall serve its initial disclosures. 
5. Plaintiffs' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents: Each 
defendant shall serve responses to Plaintiffs' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
within thirty (30) days after service of Plaintiff s responses to Defendants' Master Interrogatories 
A 
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and Requests for Production. The Plaintiffs5 Master Interrogatories and Requests for. Production 
are deemed served at the time.the.defendant is properly:served with process.. • • 
6. Attorneys Planning Conference: As soon as practicable after filing plaintiffs Initial 
Disclosures, plaintiffs counsel shall convene an attorneys planning conference with all defense 
counsel. The conference may be held by telephone. At this planning conference all counsel 
shall agree on the following: 
a. The deadline for completing factual discovery; 
b. The date by which defendants shall identify those non-party defendants to 
whom they shall seek to allocate fault; 
c. The date by whichj>laintiffs' counsel shall designate their experts; 
d. The date3 typically 60 days thereafter, by which plaintiff's experts shall 
produce their reports;. ; •• .;.;./.:;•.;/ ;• •'.;. ••-->••/..;.'.:•:.•.:. ./' \:\r ."•;*;'•;*' \ ••. • • v.-
e.' The date, typically 45 days'after receipt of plaintiff s experts' reports,, by 
which defendants shall designate their experts; 
- £ The date, typically 60 days after designation, by which defendants' experts 
shall produce their reports; 
g. The date by which expert discovery, shall be complete; . ..->,. 
h The deadline for filing dispositive motions; 
i. If counsel are unable to reach an agreement regarding these matters, any party 
may file a motion for a scheduling conference with the court pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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7. Length of Deposition: . . . . . 
a. The defendants shall have a total of 20 hours in which to complete the 
deposition of the plaintiff.. This time limit does not include breaks or recesses. The deposition of 
a plaintiff may be extended beyond 20 hours for good cause shown. 
b. The deposition of a plaintiff shall be taken in Salt Lake County to the extent 
possible. In those cases where a plaintiff is not able to travel, the deposition shall be taken in the 
community where the plaintiff resides-. , r • ...... 
EL 
ADBITIONAL DISCOVERY 
1. Supplementing Answersto Interrogatories and Responses to Requests for Production: 
If plaintiffs or defendants have previously answered Interrogatories or Requests for Production, 
they need only to supplement their answers to those Interrogatories or Requests pursuant to the -. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but no later than thirty (30) days before trial, absent special 
circumstances. 
2. Rule 35 Examinations of Plaintiff: Defendants are entitled to arrange for the Rule 35 
examination(s) of the plaintiff, if living, to be conducted by a physician(s) of defendants1 choice 
and at defendants' expense.. . . - . - : • - . . . - ., •.•..-•>. ..-, ....
 fc- ,--.^...,:r,;v..,,,- -:.:-..-.,..-. .*• 
a.' Defendants shall agree among themselves on the identity of the specialist who 
will conduct the Rule 35 examination. Under ordinary circumstances, plaintiff shall be examined 
by only one physician. 
b. In those cases where plaintiff alleges physical and/or mental conditions that 
require assessment by more than one specialist, plaintiff may be required to. submit to an • 
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additional physical or mental examination for each condition. The need forthese additional Rule 
35 examinations shall be determined oh a cas6-by-cas£hasis: ' • •-••••'*••••• •"•• 
c - TEe Rule 35 examination will be conducted in Salt Lake County to the extent 
possible. In those cases where the plaintiff is unable to travel, the Rule 35 examination will be 
conducted in the community where plaintiff resides. 
d. The parties recognize that there may be circumstances under which a Rule 35 
examination may need to be conducted by a physician located outside the State of Utah. The 
need for and arrangements pertaining to such an examination shall be resolved on a case-by-case 
basis. 
3. Pathology Materials: Plaintiff agrees to provide to one defendants'- attorney all of the 
plaintiff s pathology materials and those original chest images in his/her possession, as soon as-
practicable, but ho later than"one-KMdfea twenty (120)'days after-the filing-of the* complaint;- o r -
the entry of this Case Management Order," whichever is later, absent special circumstances. • 
a. The Defense Counsel to whom these materials are delivered shall be the 
custodian for the plaintiff s pathology materials, chest x-rays, and related medical materials 
when they are provided for examination and all parties shall work together to allow_all parties to 
use these materials as needed in preparing their medical work up in these cases.- Each defendant 
has the absolute right to examine the pathology materials, chest images, and related medical 
materials independently of the other defendants. : • . - • • 
b. All pathology materials, chest images and related medical materials received 
directly from plaintiff shall be returned to plaintiffs counsel upon completion of the defendants3 
examination thereof. The parties-may make agreements:to share"the costs and acquisition of •:•. 
medical records, pathology materials, chest x-rays, and related materials. 
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c. No destructive testing will be done without giving thirty (30) days5 prior notice 
to all parties. Those.parties objecting to the destructive testing shall file their objections with the 
Court prior to the expiration of the*3 0-day notice period. If an objection is filed, no destructive 
testing shall occur until the objection has been resolved. 
d. The results of any destructive testing shall be made available to all parties 
upon order of the court. 
e. Pathology materials and originalradiological studies received pursuant to_ 
plaintifFs authorization shall be returned to plaintifFs counsel no later than thirty (30) days prior 
to trial. 
4. Written Report of Rule 35 Rumination: The defendants shall serve a written report 
of any Rule 35 examination described in paragraph 2 of this Section El, as soon as practicable 
after the examination but no later than fortyrfive (45) days prior to the deadline for completing- • 
expert discovery unless otherwise agreed by counsel. 
5. Notice of Death and Autopsy: Plaintiffs attorney, upon learning of the death of 
Plaintiff shall immediately notify Gounsel for Defendants of Plaintiff s death. 
a. PlaintifFs spouse or another of plaintiffs representatives shall produce the 
body 'of the'deceased for one full and complete autopsy,, mGlu4ing-the?thorsci.G and abdominal .T. 
cavities, to be performed by the state medical examiner or a competent pathologist designated by 
plaintifFs counsel unless otherwise ordered by the Court upon good cause shown. 
b. A showing of "good cause" may include religious beliefs and family 
preferences regarding autopsies, although these factors are not necessarily determinative of .the 
issue. 
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c. Appropriate and adequate quantities of tissue shall.be obtained and.preserved 
for inspection and review by pathologists selected by the-parties and all tissue samples selected . 
and preserved at the autopsy shall be made available to all parties for appropriate medical and 
pathological testing. 
rv. 
NO EVIDENCE DISMISSAL 
1. C6No Evidence" Letter: At the close of the factual discovery pertinent to a specific 
defendant, that defendant may, in good faith, serve a "no evidence" letter upon plaintiff. 
' ~£. " ~~The7iefeh3^fiMs^^ 
(i) that the attorney has reviewed or caused to be reviewed by another 
attorney or a legal assistant working under the direction of the attorney all of the exchanged 
discovery; .. . .. ...... .. . . . . , . , • .,..,.. 
(ii) that the defendant has provided the plaintiff with all information in its 
possession, custody, or. control, other than experts' reports, which are required by the master 
order, or pursuant to any discovery request or court order; and 
(iii) that the plaintiff's discovery responses have not identified any 
evidence tending to.show.plaintiff or plaintiff8 s decedent was exposed to.asbestqs for which the 
defendant was responsible. 
b. Plaintiff must respond to .said letter, either agreeing to dismissal with prejudice 
and a mutual waiver of costs, or rejecting the letter, no later than 10 days from service of the 
letter. Failure to do "so will be deemed to be an agreement for dismissal.. 
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v. 
TRIALSETTING 
1. Timing of Dispositive Motions: Except as set forth in Section IV, dealing with No 
Evidence Dismissals, motions for summary judgment shall not be filed until after the close of 
discovery. Motions to dismiss may be filed at any time after the completion of discovery 
pertaining to the particular issue on which the motion to dismiss is based, 
2. Trial Setting: Once dispositive motions have been decided, andihe remaining.parties 
have attempted to settle through mediation an individual case may be set for trial. 
3. Exigent Cases: A case may be set for ah exigent trial setting, which will occur, to the 
extent possible, no later than seven months after the Court declares the matter as an exigent case. 
a. An exigent case is defined as follows: 
(i) Mesothelioma: Any living plaintiff who has been diagnosed in writing 
by a Board Certified Pulmonoiogist with Malignant Mesothelioma, shall be presumed exigent. 
(ii) Lung Cancer, Other Cancer and Other Asbestos Related Disease: 
Any living plaintiff who has been diagnosed in writing by a Board Certified Pulmonoiogist with 
an asbestos related disease, and for whom the Board Certified Pulmonoiogist will sign an 
affidavit stating that s/he has personally examined the plaintiff and that there}s a substantial, 
medical doubt that the plaintiff will survive beyond six months. 
b. Plaintiffs counsel shall file a motion seeking that a case be designated as 
exigent. Defendants shall have 14 days thereafter to object on the basis that the scheduled case 
does not meet the definition of an exigent case. 
c. Each exigent case will have a separate six-month pre-trial scheduling order 
entered, using the same basic format as the attorneys planning conference format used in all non-
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exigent cases. Plaintiff may request a trial setting upon completion of its obligation to provide 
complete medical records, pathological materials, autOpsy.reports (where applicable) and product 
identification evidence. .. •.-.••-- - . . . . „ , . ..... 
d. The subsequent death of the plaintiff will be considered just cause for 
returning the case to a non-exigent status unless the court rules otherwise. Issues resulting from 
the death of the plaintiff (e.g., failure to comply with formalities in regard to proper substitution 
of plaintiff, medical and autopsy issues, impact on the jury if one has already been impaneled, 
etc.) may be considered by the court in regard to a request for maintaining the case on an exigent 
trial setting. _ 
Dated this / day of 
Glenn K. Iwasaki 
: District Court Judge Kgg**& 
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BifUSISTRICTWUBT 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUN 2 6 2003 
Daputy Clerk 
IN RE ASBESTOS LITIGATION 
By-
FIRST AMENDED CASE 
MANAGEMENT ORDER NO. 1 
Case No. 010900863 AS 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Based upon representations by various potential plaintiffs' counsel to the judges of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, this Order is entered in anticipation of a 
substantial increase in asbestos litigation in Utah courts. 
This Order is intended to facilitate the administration of those cases involving allegations of 
asbestos exposure by reducing multiple filings and hearings and by setting out orders for the orderly 
disposition of such cases. This Order shall apply to all cases filed by Brayton Purcell and by Ness, 
Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole in which a claim for money damages is based upon 
allegations of exposure to products containing asbestos and/or machinery calling for the use of 
asbestos ("asbestos cases"). 
I. 
GENERAL PROCEDURES 
1. Cover Sheet: A cover sheet shall be filed with each pleading. The cover sheet shall 
list the party filing the pleading and its counsel; it shall also list in a vertical column all other parties. 
2. Master Service List: Plaintiffs' counsel shall maintain a master service list of all 
counsel representing parties in any asbestos case governed by this Order. Defense counsel shall e-
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mail their addresses to plaintiffs' counsel at the time they enter their appearances. An updated copy 
of this master service list will also be filed in the offices of Judge Iwasaki. It is the responsibility 
of all parties to ensure that the current master service list, as updated, is used for the service of all 
master pleadings. 
3. Service of Pleadings and Documents: Any party required to serve any notice in an 
asbestos case shall serve one copy of the document on counsel for each party as they appear on the 
service list for that individual case, and file it with the Court as appropriate. 
a. The parties may stipulate to service of any pleading, discovery document, or 
other written material by e-mail ("e-service") in lieu of standard service by mail or hand delivery, 
and are encouraged to do so. Such e-service shall be deemed the same as service by hand delivery 
for computing time to file a response. 
b. No party will be deemed bound by e-service unless it has affirmatively stated 
that it will agree to such service in writing, but if such an election is made by a party in one case, it 
will be deemed effective in all cases until expressly rejected in writing. Also, if an attorney 
stipulates to e-service on behalf of one client s/he will be expected to accept e-service for all his/her 
clients. Parties may reject a prior e-service agreement if such an election is not made. 
4. Status of Service of Process. At the time Initial Disclosures by plaintiff are due, 
plaintiffs' counsel shall provide a list of all parties who have been served to date and their attorneys. 
The Certificate of Service on the Initial Disclosures is sufficient to satisfy this requirement. 
Defendants shall have forty-five (45) days from the date of proper service in which to file an Answer 
or otherwise plead. 
PWBGL: 41721 v.2 -2-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5. Rules of Civil Procedure: The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all asbestos 
cases except to the extent that those rules are modified by this First Amended Case Management 
Order. 
6. Master Pleadings: It is hereby ordered that an action entitled In re: Asbestos 
Litigation, Master Case No. 010900863 AS, shall become the Master case for all cases involving 
exposure to asbestos-containing products. This Master Asbestos Case shall serve as a depository for 
all asbestos liability actions. Pleadings, discovery matters, motions, orders, exhibit and witness lists, 
pre-trial statements and other documents common to all cases shall be filed only in the Master 
Asbestos Case and not in any individual case. When counsel enters an appearance for the first time 
for a particular defendant, s/he should file his/her notice of appearance in the Master Asbestos Case. 
Counsel are thereafter required to notify the Clerk of Court of all changes in their address, telephone 
numbers, and fax numbers. 
a. In each case, the parties may, if they wish, incorporate by reference any 
specifically described master pleading, whether that master pleading is filed by that party or by any 
other party; 
b. Plaintiff s counsel should file a Master Complaint and then incorporate it by 
reference in a brief complaint filed on behalf of each individual plaintiff; 
c. Defendants are encouraged to file Master Answers and to incorporate their 
Master Answers by reference in answering the individual Complaints filed on behalf of each 
plaintiff. 
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d. Any party shall have the right to move against or contest any master pleading 
as though that master pleading were filed in an individual case. 
7. Attribution of Fault: Until further order of the Court, defendants are presumed to have 
no cross-claims against one another for contribution, indemnity or allocation of fault. However, 
consistent with §78-37-41, Utah Code Anno., each defendant will notify plaintiffs9 counsel, by the 
date set at the attorneys5 planning meeting or upon further order of the court, of the identity of those 
non-party defendants it intends to place on the jury verdict form for purposes of the allocation of 
fault. 
8. Pro Hac Vice Admissions: 
a. Motion for admission: When local counsel seek a first time association and 
admission of an out-of-state attorney, local counsel shall present Judge Iwasaki with an ex-parte 
motion and related paperwork that shall fully comply with all requirements of Utah law. The motion 
shall be filed in the master case file, bearing the case number noted on this Case Management Order. 
b. Scope of order: An order admitting counselpro hac vice in a Salt Lake County 
asbestos exposure case shall provide that it is effective in all then pending actions and shall be 
effective in any future actions filed in Salt Lake County alleging damages from asbestos exposure. 
Once an out-of-state attorney has been admitted in any case pursuant to this Case Management 
Order, local counsel need only file a copy of the order admitting that counsel in any other asbestos-
related case in which the out-of-state attorney wishes to appear. 
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c. Notice of changes: Local counsel and an out-of-state attorney admitted pro 
hac vice shall promptly notify the Court of any changes in the out-of-state attorney's bar admission 
status. 
d. Timing of Filings: Orders for admission pro hac vice may be filed at any time 
prior to the last judicial day before trial. Motions for admission/?™ hac vice or related orders made 
subsequent to that time will be granted only for good cause shown. 
9. Non-waiver of Rights: By entry of this Case Management Order, the parties have not 
waived any of their rights including, but not limited to, the right to contest joinder, jurisdiction, or 
venue, or the right to seek removal to federal court. Moreover, the parties have not waived their 
rights to assert or contest the manner in which these cases should be tried nor have the parties waived 
their rights to seek modifications of this order in individual cases upon motion and for good cause 
shown. 
10. Preservation of Privileges: The joint defense privilege and the common interest 
privilege are preserved to the extent allowed under the law of Utah and, by conferring or meeting 
or exchanging documents, defendants have not waived any attorney/client or work product privilege. 
11. Amendment of Case Management Order: For good cause shown, any party may 
move, or the Court may act on its own motion, to amend this Case Management Order. 
12. Severance of Punitive Damages: The Court has taken the issue of whether to sever 
any claims for punitive damages from the compensatory damages under advisement. 
13. Amendment of Complaints: Plaintiffs may amend their complaint in any case, prior 
to the completion of discovery, without stipulation of the parties or leave of court, provided that the 
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only purpose for the amendment is to add additional defendants to the case, and no substantive 
changes are made to the allegations against any existing defendant. 
14. Dismissal of Complaints: Plaintiffs may unilaterally dismiss a case without prejudice 
at any time prior to the close of discovery in the case based upon a determination that the case cannot 
be successfully pursued. The procedure for unilateral dismissal may not be employed, however, if 
the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel reasonably believes that the case may be re-filed in this or any 
other jurisdiction at any time in the future. 
n. 
DISCOVERY: INITIAL PHASE 
1. Initial Disclosures: No later than 30 days after the filing of the first answer to a 
complaint plaintiff shall serve his/her Initial Disclosures, which shall include all of the information 
required by Rule 26(a)(1) plus: 
a. The exposed person's Social Security Number; 
b. The exposed person's date of birth; 
c. A complete list of the exposed person's employers, with last known addresses 
and phone numbers, to the extent reasonably available; 
d. The exposed person's medical history; and 
e. A complete list of all of the exposed persons' health insurance carriers for the 
last 10 years. 
2. Authorization for Obtaining Records: Simultaneous with the filing and service of the 
initial disclosures, plaintiff will provide to an attorney designated by defense counsel signed original 
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authorizations (current within 120 days) to enable defendants to obtain medical records, VA records, 
union records, income tax records, Social Security earnings records, Social Security disability 
records, Social Security Printouts, military records, worker's compensation records, and past or 
present employers' personnel records. 
a. These authorizations are for documents, pathology material, and original 
radiological films and are not to be construed to authorize verbal communications that are not 
otherwise allowable. 
b. The records described in this paragraph 2 of Section II, which are produced 
by any party pursuant to these authorizations, are determined by the court to be authentic under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, unless specific objection is made thereto at least thirty (3 0) days prior 
to trial. 
c. These records are not to be filed with the court. 
d. The attorney designated by defendants to receive the authorizations shall make 
a complete copy of all records obtained pursuant to these authorizations available to plaintiffs 
counsel. 
3. Defendants' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents: No 
later than one-hundred-twenty (120) days after the filing of a complaint, plaintiff shall serve a copy 
of the plaintiffs responses to Defendants' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents, together with a copy of the requested documents. The Master Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production are deemed served at the time plaintiff files his/her complaint. 
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4. Defendants' Initial Disclosures: No later than thirty (30) days after filing its answer, 
each defendant shall serve its initial disclosures. 
5. Plaintiffs' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents: Each 
defendant shall serve responses to Plaintiffs' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
within thirty (30) days after service of Plaintiff's responses to Defendants' Master Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production. The Plaintiff s Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production are 
deemed served at the time the defendant is properly served with process. 
6. Attorneys' Planning Conference: As soon as practicable after filing plaintiff s Initial 
Disclosures and after service has been perfected on all named defendants which are subject to service 
and are not engaged in private settlement negotiations with the plaintiff, plaintiffs counsel shall 
convene an attorneys' planning conference with all defense counsel. The conference may be held 
by telephone. 
a. At this planning conference all counsel shall agree on the following: 
1. The date by which plaintiff shall identify: 
(a) the asbestos-containing products, or types of products 
manufactured or distributed by a particular defendant, to 
which he/she was allegedly exposed; 
(b) the period of time during which plaintiff alleges that the 
exposure occurred; 
(c) the location at which plaintiff alleges that the exposure 
occurred; 
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(d) the manner in which plaintiff alleges he/she was exposed to 
each identified product, and whether plaintiff alleges that the 
exposure was direct or indirect; 
(e) any documents plaintiff contends will support the 
identification of each product specified; and 
(f) the names, addresses and telephone numbers of any and all 
witnesses who will testify to plaintiffs exposure to each 
identified product; provided, however, that witnesses who are 
asbestos plaintiffs themselves shall be contacted, if at all, 
through their asbestos counsel; and provided further that, to 
the extent reasonably possible, defendants will coordinate 
their contacts with plaintiff s product identification witnesses 
in an effort to protect them from an inordinate number of 
interview requests. 
The deadline for completing factual discovery; 
The date, following the close of fact discovery, by which defendants 
shall identify those non-parties to whom they shall seek to allocate 
fault; 
The date by which plaintiffs counsel shall designate plaintiff's case-
specific expert witnesses and serve Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert witness 
reports as follows: 
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(a) Injury and Damage Experts: Plaintiffs counsel shall serve 
case-specific expert witness reports with respect to Plaintiff s 
injury and damage claims; 
(b) Industrial Hygienists: Plaintiffs counsel may serve a single 
work-site specific expert witness report for all cases involving 
the same work-site if the expert is not expected to present 
case-specific testimony at trial; and 
(c) General Experts: Plaintiff's counsel may serve a Master 
Expert Report for any experts who will testify generally, and 
\ not based upon a review of case-specific or work-site specific 
information. 
5. The date (typically 60 to 120 days after the plaintiffs designation of 
expert witnesses and service of Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert witness 
reports) by which defendants' counsel shall designate defendants' 
case-specific expert witnesses and serve Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert 
witness reports as follows: 
(a) Injury and Damage Experts: Defendants' counsel shall serve 
case-specific expert witness reports with respect to any expert 
witnesses expected to testify with respect to plaintiffs injury 
and damage claims; 
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(b) Industrial Hygienists: Defendants5 counsel may serve a single 
work-site specific expert witness report for all cases involving 
the same work-site if the witness is not expected to give case-
specific testimony at trial; and 
(c) General Experts: Defendants' counsel may serve a Master 
Expert Report for any experts who will testify generally, and 
not based upon a review of case-specific or work-site specific 
information. 
6. The deadline for completing expert witness discovery; and 
7. The deadline for filing dispositive motions. 
b. If counsel are unable to reach an agreement regarding these matters, any party 
may file a motion for a scheduling conference with the court pursuant to Rule 
16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
c. If at any time after the Attorneys' Planning Meeting has been held and/or a 
scheduling order has been entered in a particular case, a plaintiff amends 
his/her complaint to add additional defendants in the case, a new Attorneys' 
Planning Meeting will be convened, including counsel for the new parties, to 
consider whether changes to the scheduling order are appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
PWBGL: 41721 v.2 -11-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
HI. 
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY 
1. Supplementing Answers to Interrogatories and Responses to Requests for Production: 
If plaintiffs or defendants have previously answered Interrogatories or Requests for Production, they 
need only supplement their answers to those Interrogatories or Requests pursuant to the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, but required supplementation shall occur no later than thirty (30) days before 
trial, absent special circumstances. •  
2. Rule 35 Examinations of Plaintiff: Defendants are entitled to arrange for the Rule 35 
examination(s) of the plaintiff, if living, to be conducted by aphysician(s) of defendants' choice and 
at defendants' expense. 
a. Defendants shall agree among themselves on the identity of the specialist who 
will conduct the Rule 35 examination. Under ordinary circumstances, plaintiff shall be examined 
by only one physician. 
b. In those cases where plaintiff alleges physical and/or mental conditions that 
require assessment by more than one specialist, plaintiff may be required to submit to an additional 
physical or mental examination for each condition. The need for these additional Rule 35 
examinations shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
c. The Rule 3 5 examination will be conducted in Salt Lake County to the extent 
possible. In those cases where the plaintiff is unable to travel, the Rule 35 examination will be 
conducted in the community where plaintiff resides. 
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d. The parties recognize that there may be circumstances under which a Rule 3 5 
examination may need to be conducted by a physician located outside the State of Utah. The need 
for and arrangements pertaining to such an examination shall be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 
3. Pathology Materials: Plaintiff agrees to provide to one defendants' attorney all of the 
plaintiff's pathology materials and those original chest images in his/her possession, as soon as 
practicable, but no later than one-hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the complaint absent 
special circumstances. 
a. The Defense Counsel to whom these materials are delivered shall be the 
custodian for the plaintiff's pathology materials, chest x-rays, and related medical materials when 
they are provided for examination and all parties shall work together to allow all parties to use these 
materials as needed in preparing their medical work up in these cases. Each defendant has the 
absolute right to examine the pathology materials, chest images, and related medical materials 
independently of the other defendants. 
b. All pathology materials, chest images and related medical materials received 
directly from plaintiff shall be returned to plaintiffs counsel upon completion of the defendants' 
examination thereof. The parties may make agreements to share the costs and acquisition of medical 
records, pathology materials, chest x-rays, and related materials. 
c. No destructive testing will be done without giving thirty (30) days' prior 
notice to all parties. Those parties objecting to the destructive testing shall file their objections with 
the Court prior to the expiration of the 30-day notice period. If an objection is filed, no destructive 
testing shall occur until the objection has been resolved. 
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d. The results of any destructive testing shall be made available to all parties 
upon order of the court. 
e. Pathology materials and original radiological studies received pursuant to 
plaintiffs authorization shall be returned to.plaintiffs counsel no later than thirty (30) days prior to 
trial. 
4. Written Report of Rule 35 Examination: The defendants shall serve a written report 
of any Rule 35 examination described in paragraph 2 of this Section HI, as soon as practicable after 
the examination but no later than forty-five (45) days prior to the deadline for completing expert 
discovery unless otherwise agreed by counsel. 
5. Notice of Death and Autopsy: Plaintiffs attorney, upon learning of the death, of 
Plaintiff shall immediately notify counsel for Defendants of Plaintiff's death. 
a. Plaintiff's spouse or another of plaintiff s representatives shall produce the 
body of the deceased for one full and complete autopsy, including the thoracic and abdominal 
cavities, to be performed by the state medical examiner or a competent pathologist designated by 
plaintiffs counsel unless otherwise ordered by the Court upon good cause shown. 
b. A showing of "good cause" may include religious beliefs and family 
preferences regarding autopsies, although these factors are not necessarily determinative of the issue. 
c. Appropriate and adequate quantities of tissue shall be obtained and preserved 
for inspection and review by pathologists selected by the parties and all tissue samples selected and 
preserved at the autopsy shall be made available to all parties for appropriate medical and 
pathological testing. 
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IV. 
NO EVIDENCE DISMISSAL 
1. No Evidence Letter: At the close of fact discovery pertinent to a specific defendant, 
that defendant may, in good faith, serve a "No Evidence Letter" upon plaintiff. 
a. The defendant must certify in the No Evidence Letter as follows: 
(1) that the attorney has reviewed, or caused to be reviewed by another 
attorney or a legal assistant working under the direction of the 
attorney, all of the exchanged discovery; 
(2) that the defendant has provided the plaintiff with all information in its 
possession, custody, or control, other than expert witness reports, 
which are required by the Case Management Order, or pursuant to 
any discovery request or court order; and 
(3) that the PlaintifFs discovery responses have not identified any 
evidence tending to showplaintiff or plaintiff s decedent was exposed 
to asbestos for which the defendant was responsible. 
b. Plaintiff must respond to a No Evidence Letter agreeing to dismiss the 
defendant with prejudice and a mutual waiver of costs, or rejecting the letter, 
no later than 10 days after service of the letter. Failure to respond shall be 
deemed an agreement to dismissal. 
c. If Plaintiff rejects the No Evidence Letter, Plaintiff must state the factual and 
legal basis for rejecting it. 
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d. If Plaintiff rejects the No Evidence Letter and/or refuses to agree to dismissal 
with prejudice and a mutual waiver of costs, Defendant may file a motion for 
summary judgment without the necessity of awaiting completion of expert 
discovery. 
e. In the event a defendant files a motion for summary judgment pursuant to this 
paragraph, plaintiff shall have 45 days within which to respond. 
V. 
TRIAL SETTING 
1. Timing of Dispositive Motions: Except as set forth in Section IV, dealing with No 
Evidence Dismissals, motions for summary judgment shall not be filed until after the close of 
discovery. Motions to dismiss may be filed at any time after the completion of discovery pertaining 
to the particular issue on which the motion to dismiss is based. 
2. Trial Setting: Once dispositive motions have been decided and the remaining parties 
have attempted to settle through mediation, an individual case may be set for trial. 
3.. Exigent Cases: A case may be set for an exigent trial setting, which will occur, to the 
extent possible, no later than seven months after the Court declares the matter as an exigent case, 
a. An exigent case is defined as follows: 
(i) Mesothelioma: Any living plaintiff who has been diagnosed in writing 
by a Board Certified Pulmonologist with Malignant Mesothelioma, shall be presumed exigent. 
(ii) Lung Cancer, Other Cancer and Other Asbestos-Related Disease: Any 
living plaintiff who has been diagnosed in writing by a Board Certified Pulmonologist with an 
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asbestos related disease, and for whom the Board Certified Pulmonologist will sign an affidavit 
stating that s/he has personally examined the plaintiff and that there is a substantial medical doubt 
that the plaintiff will survive beyond six months. 
b. Plaintiffs counsel shall file a motion seeking that a case be designated as 
exigent. Defendants shall have 14 days thereafter to object on the basis that the scheduled case does 
not meet the definition of an exigent case. 
c. Each exigent case will have a separate six-month pre-trial scheduling order 
entered, using the same basic format as the attorneys' planning conference format used in all non-
exigent cases. Plaintiff may request a trial setting upon completion of its obligation to provide 
complete medical records, pathological materials, autopsy reports (where applicable) and product 
identification evidence. 
d. The subsequent death of the plaintiff will be considered just cause for 
returning the case to a non-exigent status unless the court rules otherwise. Issues resulting from the 
death of the plaintiff (e.g., failure to comply with formalities in regard to proper substitution of 
plaintiff, medical and autopsy issues, impact on the jury if one has already been impaneled, etc.) may 
be considered by the court in regard to a request for maintaining the case on an exigent trial setting. 
Dated this ^ ^ day of 
Glenn K. Iwasaki 
District Court Judge 
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T 
IN RE ASBESTOS LITIGATION 
HUBMSTMcrCNIT 
IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT T h i r d J u d i c i a l District 
-~v 3 0 2003 
—g^TZAKE COLJNTT 
Deputy Clerk 
SECOND AMENDED CASE 
MANAGEMENT ORDER NO. 1 
Case No. 010900863 AS 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Based upon representations by various potential plaintiffs' counsel to the judges of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, this Order is entered in anticipation of a 
substantial increase in asbestos litigation in Utah courts. 
This order is intended to facilitate the administration of those cases involving allegations 
of asbestos exposure by reducing multiple filings and hearings and by setting out orders for the 
orderly disposition of such cases. This order shall apply to all cases filed by Brayton Purcell and 
by Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole in which a claim for money damages is based 
upon allegations of exposure to products containing asbestos and/or machinery calling for the use 
of asbestos ("asbestos cases"). 
I. 
GENERAL PROCEDURES 
1. Cover Sheet: A cover sheet shall be filed with each pleading. The cover sheet 
shall list the party filing the pleading and its counsel; it shall also list in a vertical column all 
other parties. 
2. Master Service List: Plaintiffs' counsel shall maintain a master service list of all 
counsel representing parties in any asbestos cases governed by this Order. Defense counsel shall 
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e-mail their addresses to plaintiffs' counsel at the time they enter their appearances. An updated 
copy of this master service list will also be filed in the offices of Judge Iwasaki. It is the 
responsibility of all parties to ensure that the current master service list, as updated, is used for 
the service of all master pleadings. 
3. Service of Pleadings and Documents: Any party required to serve any notice in an 
asbestos case shall serve one copy of the document on counsel for each party as they appear on 
the service list for that individual case, and file it with the Court as appropriate. 
a. The parties may stipulate to service of any pleading, discovery document, 
or other written material by e-mail ("e-service11) in lieu of standard service by mail or hand 
delivery, and are encouraged to do so. Such e-service shall be deemed the same as service by 
hand delivery for computing time to file a response. 
b. No party will be deemed bound by e-service unless it has affirmatively 
stated that it will agree to such service in writing, but if such an election is made by a party in one 
case, it will be deemed effective in all cases until expressly rejected in writing. Also, if an 
attorney stipulates to e-service on behalf of one client s/he will be expected to accept e-service 
for all his/her clients. Parties may reject a prior e-service agreement if such an election is not 
made. 
4. Status of Service of Process: At the time Initial Disclosures by plaintiff are due, 
plaintiffs' counsel shall provide a list of all parties who have been served to date and their 
attorneys. The Certificate of Service on the Initial Disclosures is sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement. Defendants shall have forty-five (45) days from the date of proper service in which 
to file an Answer or otherwise plead. 
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5. Rules of Civil Procedure: The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all 
asbestos cases except to the extent that those rules are modified by this Second Amended Case 
Management Order. 
6. Master Pleadings: It is hereby ordered that an action entitled In re: Asbestos 
Litigation. Master Case No. 010900863 AS, shall become the Master case for all cases involving 
exposure to asbestos-containing products. This Master Asbestos Case shall serve as a depository 
for all asbestos liability actions. Pleadings, discovery matters, motions, orders, exhibit and 
witness lists, pre-trial statements and other documents common to all cases shall be filed only in 
the Master Asbestos Case and not in any individual case. When counsel enters an appearance for 
the first time for a particular defendant, s/he should file his/her notice of appearance in the 
Master Asbestos Case. Counsel are thereafter required to notify the Clerk of Court of all changes 
in their address, telephone numbers, and fax numbers. 
a. In each case, the parties may, if they wish, incorporate by reference any 
specifically described master pleading, whether that master pleading is filed by that party or by 
any other party; 
b. Plaintiffs counsel should file a Master Complaint and then incorporate it 
by reference in a brief complaint filed on behalf of each individual plaintiff; 
c. Defendants are encouraged to file Master Answers and to incorporate their 
Master Answers by reference in answering the individual Complaints filed on behalf of each 
plaintiff. 
d. Any party shall have the right to move against or contest any master 
pleading as though that master pleading were filed in an individual case. 
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7. Attribution of Fault: In each case in which a railroad is included as a defendant 
and alleged to be liable under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, that railroad 
defendant is presumed to have properly pled cross-claims for contribution and indemnity against 
all other defendants, and all other defendants likewise are deemed to have pled a general denial 
to the railroad defendant's contribution and indemnity cross-claims. Until further order of the 
Court, all non-railroad defendants are presumed to have no cross-claims against one another for 
contribution, indemnity or allocation of fault. However, consistent with § 78-27-41, Utah Code 
Ann., those defendants will notify plaintiffs' counsel, by the date set in the attorneys' planning 
meeting or upon further order of the Court, of the identity of those non-party defendants it 
intends to place on the jury verdict form for purposes of the allocation of fault. Nothing herein 
precludes any railroad defendant from bringing third-party claims for contribution or indemnity. 
8. Pro Hac Vice Admissions: 
a. Motion for admission: When local counsel seek a first time association 
and admission of an out-of-state attorney, local counsel shall present Judge Iwasaki with an ex-
parte motion and related paperwork that shall fully comply with all requirements of Utah law. 
The motion shall be filed in the master case file, bearing the case number noted on this Case 
Management Order. 
b. Scope of order: An order admitting counsel pro hac vice in a Salt Lake 
County asbestos exposure case shall provide that it is effective in all then pending actions and 
shall be effective in any future actions filed in Salt Lake County alleging damages from asbestos 
exposure. Once an out-of-state attorney has been admitted in any case pursuant to this Case 
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Management Order, local counsel need only file a copy of the order admitting that counsel in any 
other asbestos-related case in which the out-of-state attorney wishes to appear. 
c. Notice of changes: Local counsel and an out-of-state attorney admitted pro 
hac vice shall promptly notify the Court of any changes in the out-of-state attorney's bar 
admission status. 
d. Timing of Filings Orders for admission pro hac vice may be filed at any 
time prior to the last judicial day before trial. Motions for admission pro hac vice or related 
orders made subsequent to that time will be granted only for good cause shown. 
9. Non-waiver of Rights: By entry of this Case Management Order, the parties have 
not waived any of their rights including, but not limited to, the right to contest joinder, 
jurisdiction, or venue, or the right to seek removal to federal court. Moreover, the parties have 
not waived their rights to assert or contest the manner in which these cases should be tried nor 
have the parties waived their rights to seek modifications of this order in individual cases upon 
motion and for good cause shown. 
10. Preservation of Privileges: The joint defense privilege and the common interest 
privilege are preserved to the extent allowed under the law of Utah and, by conferring or meeting 
or exchanging documents, defendants have not waived any attorney/client or work product 
privilege. 
11. Amendment of Case Management Order: For good cause shown, any party may 
move, or the court may act on its own motion, to amend this Case Management Order. 
12. Severance of Punitive Damages: The Court has taken the issue of whether to sever 
any claims for punitive damages from the compensatory damages under advisement. 
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13. Amendment of Complaints: Plaintiffs may amend their complaint in any case, 
prior to the completion of discovery, without stipulation of the parties or leave of court, provided 
that the only purpose for the amendment is to add additional defendants to the case, and no 
substantive changes are made to the allegations against any existing defendant. 
14. Dismissal of Complaints: Plaintiffs may unilaterally dismiss a case without 
prejudice at any time prior to the close of discovery in the case based upon a determination that 
the case cannot be successfully pursued. The procedure for unilateral dismissal may not be 
employed, however, if the plaintiflf or plaintiffs counsel reasonably believes that the case may be 
refiled in this or another jurisdiction at any time in the future. When Plaintiffs unilaterally 
dismiss a case without prejudice based upon a determination that the case cannot be successfully 
pursued, the presumed cross-claims for contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants, as 
established by section 1.7 of this order, are deemed dismissed without prejudice. 
IL 
DISCOVERY: INITIAL PHASE 
1. Initial Disclosures: No later than 30 days after the filing of the first answer to a 
complaint plaintiff shall serve his/her Initial Disclosures, which shall include all of the 
information required by Rule 26(a)(1) plus: 
a. The exposed person's Social Security Number; 
b. The exposed person5 s date of birth; 
c. A complete list of the exposed person's employers, with last known 
addresses and phone numbers, to the extent reasonably available; 
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d. The exposed person's medical history; and 
e. A complete list of all of the exposed persons' health insurance carriers for 
the last 10 years. 
2. Authorization for Obtaining Records: Simultaneous with the filing and service of 
the initial disclosures, plaintiff will provide to an attorney designated by defense counsel signed 
original authorizations (current within 120 days) to enable defendants to obtain medical records, 
VA records, union records, income tax records, Social Security earnings records, Social Security 
disability records, Social Security Printouts, military records, worker's compensation records, 
and past or present employers' personnel records. 
a. These authorizations are for documents, pathology material, and original 
radiological films and are not to be construed to authorize verbal communications that are not 
otherwise allowable. 
b. These records described in this paragraph 2 of Section II, which are 
produced by any party pursuant to these authorizations, are determined by the court to be 
authentic under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, unless specific objection is made thereto at 
least thirty (30) days prior to trial. 
c. These records are not to be filed with the Court. 
d. The attorney designated by defendants to receive the authorizations shall 
make a complete copy of all records obtained pursuant to these authorizations available to 
plaintiffs counsel. 
3. Defendants' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents: 
No later than one-hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of a complaint, plaintiff shall serve a 
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copy of the plaintiffs responses to Defendants' Master Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents, together with a copy of the requested documents. The Master 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production are deemed served at the time plaintiff files his/her 
complaint. 
4. Defendants9 Initial Disclosures: No later than thirty (30) days after filing its 
answer, each defendant shall serve its initial disclosures. 
5. Plaintiffs' Master Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents: 
Each defendant shall serve responses to Plaintiffs' Master Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production within thirty (30) days after service of Plaintiff s responses to Defendants' Master 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production. The Plaintiffs Master Interrogatories and Requests 
for Production are deemed served at the time the defendant is properly served with process. 
6. Attorneys' Planning Conference: As soon as practicable after filing plaintiff's 
Initial Disclosures and after service has been perfected on all named defendants which are subject 
to service and are not engaged in private settlement negotiations with the plaintiff, plaintiffs 
counsel shall convene an attorneys' planning conference with all defense counsel. The 
conference may be held by telephone. 
a. At this planning conference all counsel shall agree on the following: 
1. The date by which plaintiff shall identify; 
(a) the asbestos-containing products, or types of products 
manufactured or distributed by a particular defendant, to 
which he/she was allegedly exposed; 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J ) 
(b) the period of time during which plaintiff alleges that the 
exposure occurred; 
(c) the location at which plaintiff alleges that the exposure 
occurred; 
(d) the manner in which plaintiff alleges he/she was exposed to 
each identified product, and whether plaintiff alleges that 
the exposure was direct or indirect; 
(e) any documents plaintiff contends will support the 
identification of each product specified; and 
(f) the names, addresses and telephone numbers of any and all 
witnesses who will testify to plaintiffs exposure to each 
identified product; provided, however, that witnesses who 
are asbestos plaintiffs themselves shall be contacted, if at 
all, through their asbestos counsel; and provided further 
that, to the extent reasonably possible, defendants will 
coordinate their contacts with plaintiffs product 
identification witnesses in an effort to protect them from an 
inordinate number of interview requests. 
2. The deadline for completing factual discovery; 
3. The date, following the close of fact discovery, by which 
defendants shall identify those non-parties to whom they shall seek 
to allocate fault; 
-9-
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The date by which plaintiffs counsel shall designate plaintiffs 
case-specific expert witnesses and serve Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert 
witness reports as follows: 
(a) Injury and Damage Experts: Plaintiffs counsel shall serve 
case-specific expert witness reports with respect to 
Plaintiffs injury and damage claims; 
(b) Industrial Hygienists: Plaintiffs counsel may serve a single 
work-site specific expert witness report for all cases 
involving the same work-site if the expert is not expected to 
present case-specific testimony at trial; and 
(c) General Experts: Defendant's counsel may serve a Master 
Expert Report for any experts who will testify generally, 
and not based upon a review of case-specific or work-site 
specific information. 
The date (typically 60 to 120 days after the plaintiffs designation 
of expert witnesses and service of Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert witness 
reports) by which defendants' counsel shall designate defendants' 
case-specific expert witnesses and serve Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert 
witness reports as follows: 
(a) Injury and Damage Experts: Defendants' counsel shall 
serve case-specific expert witness reports with respect to 
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any expert witnesses expected to testify with respect to 
plaintiffs injury and damage claims; 
(b) Industrial Hygienists: Defendants' counsel may serve a 
single work-site specific expert witness report for all cases 
involving the same work-site if the witness is not expected 
to give case-specific testimony at trial; and 
(c) General Experts: Defendants' counsel may serve a Master 
Expert Report for any experts who will testify generally, 
and not based upon a review of case-specific or work-site 
specific information. 
6. The deadline for completing expert witness discovery; and 
7. The deadline for filing dispositive motions. 
b. If counsel are unable to reach an agreement regarding these matters, any 
party may file a motion for a scheduling conference with the court 
pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
c. If at any time after the Attorneys' Planning Meeting has been held and/or a 
scheduling order has been entered in a particular case, a plaintiff amends 
his/her complaint to add additional defendants in the case, a new 
Attorneys' Planning Meeting will be convened, including counsel for the 
new parties, to consider whether changes to the scheduling order are 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
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in. 
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY 
1. Supplementing Answers to Interrogatories and Responses to Requests for 
Production: If plaintiffs or defendants have previously answered Interrogatories or Requests for 
Production, they need only supplement their answers to those Interrogatories or Requests 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but required supplementation shall occur no later 
than thirty (30) days before trial, absent special circumstances. 
2. Rule 35 Examinations of Plaintiff: Defendants are entitled to arrange for the Rule 
35 examination(s) of the plaintiff, if living, to be conducted by a physician(s) of defendants' 
choice and at defendants' expense. 
a. Defendants shall agree among themselves on the identity of the specialist 
who will conduct the Rule 35 examination. Under ordinary circumstances, plaintiff shall be 
examined by only one physician. 
b. In those cases where plaintiff alleges physical and/or mental conditions 
that require assessment by more than one specialist, plaintiff may be required to submit to an 
additional physical or mental examination for each condition. The need for these additional Rule 
35 examinations shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
c. The Rule 35 examination will be conducted in Salt Lake County to the 
extent possible. In those cases where the plaintiff is unable to travel, the Rule 35 examination 
will be conducted in the community where plaintiff resides. 
d. The parties recognize that there may be circumstances under which a Rule 
35 examination may need to be conducted by a physician located outside the State of Utah. The 
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need for and arrangements pertaining to such an examination shall be resolved on a case-by-case 
basis. 
3. Pathology Materials; Plaintiff agrees to provide to one defendant's attorney all of 
the plaintiffs pathology materials and those original chest images in his/her possession, as soon 
as practicable, but no later than one-hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the complaint 
absent special circumstances. 
a. The Defense Counsel to whom these materials are delivered shall be the 
custodian of the plaintiffs pathology materials, chest x-rays and related medical materials when 
they are provided for examination and all parties shall work together to allow all parties to use 
these materials as needed in preparing their medical work up in these cases. Each defendant has 
the absolute right to examine the pathology materials, chest images, and related medical 
materials independently of the other defendants. 
b. All pathology materials, chest images and related medical materials 
received directly from plaintiff shall be returned to plaintiffs counsel upon completion of the 
defendants' examination thereof. The parties may make agreements to share the costs and 
acquisition of medical records, pathology materials, chest x-rays and related materials. 
c. No destructive testing will be done without giving thirty (30) days' prior 
notice to all parties. Those parties objecting to the destructive testing shall file their objections 
with the Court prior to the expiration of the 30-day notice period. If an objection is filed, no 
destructive testing shall occur until the objection has been resolved. 
d. The results of any destructive testing shall be made available to all parties 
upon order of the court. 
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e. Pathology materials and original radiological studies received pursuant to 
plaintiffs authorization shall be returned to plaintiffs counsel no later than thirty (30) days prior 
to trial. 
4. Written Report of Rule 35 Examination: The defendants shall serve a written 
report of any Rule 35 examination described in paragraph 2 of this Section III, as soon as 
practicable after the examination but no later than forty-five (45) days prior to the deadline for 
completing expert discovery unless otherwise agreed by counsel. 
5. Notice of Death and Autopsy: Plaintiffs attorney, upon learning of the death of 
Plaintiff shall immediately notify counsel for Defendants of Plaintiffs death. 
a. Plaintiffs spouse or another of plaintiff s representatives shall produce the 
body of the deceased for one full and complete autopsy, including the thoracic and abdominal 
cavities, to be performed by the state medical examiner or a competent pathologist designated by 
plaintiffs counsel unless otherwise ordered by the court upon good cause shown. 
b. A showing of "good cause" may include religious beliefs and family 
preferences regarding autopsies, although these factors are not necessarily determinative of the 
issue. 
c. Appropriate and adequate quantities of tissue shall be obtained and 
preserved for inspection and review by pathologists selected by the parties and all tissue samples 
selected and preserved at the autopsy shall be made available to all parties for appropriate 
medical and pathological testing. 
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TV. 
NO EVIDENCE DISMISSAL 
1. No Evidence Letter: At the close of fact discovery pertinent to a specific 
defendant, that defendant may, in good faith, serve a "No Evidence Letter" upon 
plaintiff. 
a. The defendant must certify in the No Evidence Letter as follows: 
(1) that the attorney has reviewed, or caused to be reviewed by another 
attorney or a legal assistant working under the direction of the 
attorney, all of the exchanged discovery; 
(2) that the defendant has provided the plaintiff with all information in 
its possession, custody, or control, other than expert witness 
reports, which are required by the Case Management Order, or 
pursuant to any discovery request or court order; and 
(3) that the plaintiffs discovery responses have not identified any 
evidence tending to show plaintiff or plaintiffs decedent was 
exposed to asbestos for which the defendant was responsible. 
b. Plaintiff must respond to a No Evidence Letter agreeing to dismiss the 
defendant with prejudice and a mutual waiver of costs, or rejecting the 
letter, no later than 10 days after service of the letter. Failure to respond 
shall be deemed an agreement to dismissal. If plaintiff agrees to a 
no evidence dismissal of a defendant under this provision, the presumed 
cross-claims for contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants 
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against that defendant, as established by section 1.7 of this order, are 
deemed dismissed with prejudice. This dismissal occurs only if the 
railroad defendants were also served with the No Evidence Letter and did 
not object within 10 days of service. 
c. If plaintiff rejects the No Evidence Letter, plaintiff must state the factual 
and legal basis for rejecting it. 
d. If Plaintiff rejects the No Evidence Letter and/or refuses to agree to 
dismissal with prejudice and a mutual waiver of costs, Defendant may file 
a motion for summary judgment without the necessity of awaiting 
completion of expert discovery. If such a motion is granted in Defendant's 
favor, it will also be effective as to the presumed cross-claims for 
contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants, as established by 
section 1.7 of this order. The railroad defendants shall have the right to 
oppose any such motion for summary judgment. 
e. In the event a defendant files a motion for summary judgment pursuant to 
this paragraph, plaintiff shall have 45 days within which to respond. 
V. 
TRIAL SETTING 
1. Timing and Effect of Dispositive Motions: Except as set forth in Section IV, 
dealing with No Evidence Dismissals, motions for summary judgment shall not be filed until 
after the close of discovery. Motions to dismiss may be filed at any time after the completion of 
discovery pertaining to the particular issue on which the motion to dismiss is based. Dispositive 
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motions granted in a defendant's favor shall be effective as to the presumed cross-claims for 
contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants. The railroad defendants shall have the 
right to oppose any defendant's dispositive motion. If plaintiff s claims against a railroad 
defendant are dismissed on any basis, including No Evidence Letter, dispositive motion or 
settlement, then that dismissal shall also be effective as to the presumed cross-claims for 
contribution and indemnity of the railroad defendants, as established by section 1.7 of this order. 
2. Trial Setting: Once dispositive motions have been decided and the remaining 
parties have attempted to settle through mediation, an individual case may be set for trial. 
3. Exigent Cases: A case may be set for an exigent trial setting, which will occur, to 
the extent possible, no later than seven months after the court declares the matter as an exigent 
case. 
a. An exigent case is defined as follows: 
(i) Mesothelioma: any living plaintiff who has been diagnosed in 
writing by a Board Certified Pulmonologist with Malignant Mesothelioma, shall be presumed 
exigent. 
(ii) Lung Cancer, other Cancer and other Asbestos-Related Diseases: 
any living plaintiff who has been diagnosed in writing by a Board Certified Pulmonologist with 
an asbestos related disease, and for whom the Board Certified Pulmonologist will sign an 
affidavit stating that s/he has personally examined the plaintiff and that there is a substantial 
medical doubt that the plaintiff will survive beyond six months. 
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b. Plaintiffs counsel shall file a motion seeking that a case be 
designated as exigent. Defendants shall have 14 days thereafter to object on the basis that the 
scheduled case does not meet the definition of an exigent case. 
c. Each exigent case will have a separate six-month pre-trial 
scheduling order entered, using the same basic format as the attorneys' planning conference 
format used in all non-exigent cases. Plaintiff may request a trial setting upon completion of its 
obligation to prove complete medical records, pathological materials, autopsy reports (where 
applicable) and product identification evidence. 
d. The subsequent death of the plaintiff will be considered just cause 
for returning the case to a non-exigent status unless the court rules otherwise. Issues resulting 
from the death of the plaintiff (e.g., failure to comply with formalities in regard to proper 
substitution of plaintiff, medical and autopsy issues, impact on the jury if one has already been 
impaneled, etc.) may be considered by the court in regard to a request for maintaining the case on 
an exigent trial setting. 
DATED this ,2003. 
Glenn K. Iwasaki \ x,' ***** ^  /// 
District Court Judge \/t W rfi^ v ' • 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL Afi£Ijft$fiXCT tnamt 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UBffidilJudicial District 
IN RE: ASBESTOS CASES OF 
BRAYTON * PURCELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
• 
ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS, 
Defendants. 
^mj^m 
Dfin 
MEMORANDUM DECISION p 
Case No. 010900863 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
June 6, 2005 
' Clerk" 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. The Court heard oral 
argument with respect to the motion on June 6, 2005. Following 
the hearing the matter was.taken under advisement. The Court 
having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits attached 
thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the following 
ruling. 
Earlier this year, in response to a summary judgment motion 
brought by Defendants, the Court found that Dr. Schonfeld, 
Plaintiffs' expert, was required to be licensed in Utah. Since 
he.was not licensed, nor did he meet one of the other exceptions 
set forth in the Utah Code, summary judgment was granted. 
With this motion, Plaintiffs are asking the Court to 
reconsider and/or amend its ruling on several grounds. First, 
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argue Plaintiffs, 7 of the 30 Plaintiffs identified in the motion 
for summary judgment have not passed the scheduling deadline for 
designating experts and as such, they should be able to seek a 
different pulmonary expert to testify on their behalf. Second, " 
contend Plaintiffs, several other .Plaintiffs in the original 
motion have diseases other than asbestos, which do not require a 
pulmonary physician to testify as to the cause of that asbestos 
related disease. Third, Plaintiffs assert that all along the 
parties have contemplated that if dates needed to be changed, 
including expert designations, that could be accomplished at a 
later date, rather than set new dates simply to have them 
rescheduled after the summary judgment motion was heard. 
Further, argue Plaintiffs, there have been no trial dates 
scheduled and, consequently, there is no prejudice to Defendants 
if Plaintiffs are given additional time to secure the expert 
testimony of a pulmonologist.1 
1Specifically, Plaintiffs note that the Verdon Johnson case 
was recently re-filed as a wrongful death case, and to date, the 
parties have not set any discovery deadlines. Additionally, 
assert Plaintiffs, in the John Carbaugh case, Plaintiffs also 
have the expert reports of Dr. Frank Ganzhorn and Dr. Samuel 
Hammar. 
In their opposition memorandum, Defendants contend Mr. 
Johnson's case was not re-filed but rather, only amended. 
Moreover, argue Defendants, Plaintiffs in this case failed to 
have an autopsy performed on Mr. Johnson after his death and 
Defendants have filed a summary judgment motion on this basis as 
well. 
As to John Carbaugh, Defendants assert argument in this 
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Additionally, Plaintiffs request the Court to reconsider its 
ruling that Dr. Schonfeld illegally practiced medicine without a 
license. According to Plaintiffs, they agree that Dr. Schonfeld 
practiced medicine but, argue Plaintiffs, the law permits him to 
do so. Indeed, contend Plaintiffs, the legislative intent is 
clear in this regard. 
Defendants oppose the motion arguing the Court was correct 
in rejecting Plaintiffs-' expansive interpretation of the expert 
testimony from the licensure requirements of the Utah Medical 
Practice Act, and the legislative history belatedly proffered by 
Plaintiffs in their memorandum does not support an alternative 
resolution. Indeed, argue Defendants, the Court should not even 
consider the legislative history because the statute is clear and 
unambiguous. 
Additionally, assert Defendants, Plaintiffs' argument that 
they might be able to develop new medical causation evidence to 
support their claims in this case, if they are. permitted 
additional time to do so, simply does not satisfy the 
regard is not well taken as Plaintiffs had both expert reports 
prior to the hearing on this matter and prior to the filing of 
their opposition, but chose not to raise th£ issue. Second, 
argue Defendants, Plaintiffs failed to make timely designations 
of these experts and their reports. Finally, contend Defendants, 
both Drs. Ganshorn and Hammar rely on the reports of Dr. 
Schonfeld, and his pulmonary function technician, John Panzara, 
which this Court has held "inadmissible as unreliable and against 
Utah public policy." 
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requirements of Rule 59(a)(4), permitting relief from summary 
judgment for "newly discovered evidence," which could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial. 
Finally, Defendants contend Plaintiffs' Motion to reconsider 
is untimely pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59(b) and (e). 
Considering first the issue of untimeliness, pursuant to 
Rule 59(e), a motion to alter or amend judgment "shall be served 
no later than 10 days after the entry of judgment." To date, 
judgment has not been entered, accordingly, timeliness is not an 
issue. 
This said, and prior to reaching the merits of Plaintiffs' 
motion, it is important to note that at no time did Plaintiffs 
file a motion, under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, requesting'additional time to have Plaintiffs examined 
by a licensed Utah physician, to retain additional or alternative 
expert witnesses, or to supplement the evidentiary record in. 
these cases with respect to the medical causation issue, prior to 
the hearing on Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Indeed, 
by all accounts, Plaintiffs made the considered decision to rest 
their cases on the Schonfeld Reports previously offered, and the 
issue of summary judgment was submitted to the Court for decision 
on that basis. 
With the aforementioned in mind, the Court remains convinced 
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its initial determination regarding Dr. Schonfeld is an accurate 
reflection of the law. Indeed, while Court is not persuaded the 
statute is ambiguous as argued by Plaintiffs/ even taking into 
consideration the legislative history, the Court does not find an 
alternative ruling would be appropriate. 
Finally, although the Court recognizes and appreciates 
Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the seven Plaintiffs whose 
scheduling deadlines have not passed as well as the three 
Plaintiffs with unique facts, after reviewing the record in this 
matter, the Court is not persuaded such warrant the carving out 
of any exceptions. 
Based upon the forgoing, the Court affirms its initial 
ruling with respect to Defendants' Motion for. Summary Judgment. 
DATED this ( ? day of June, 2005. 
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248 Silicates and lung disease 
Figure 9.9(a) 1948 
In general, dyspnoea in a patient with bilateral pleural 
plaques is more likely to be due to airflow obstruction with 
or without emphysema or to cardiovascular disease than to 
asbestosis: for example, the case illustrated in Figure 9.8. 
It has also to be borne in mind that the appearances of 
widespread plaque formation may mask the early signs of 
tuberculosis and carcinoma of the lung. 
Ultrasound techniques are capable of detecting plaques 
which are invisible on conventional radiographs but they are 
not practical for routine purposes. 
Prognosis and complications 
Plaques themselves have no effect on life expectancy and 
are not known to give rise to any complications. 
It has been suggested that there may be an increased 
incidence of lung cancer in individuals with pleural plaques. 
However, a Finnish study of pleural plaques did not reveal 
any association between plaques and carcinoma of the lung, 
but in cases where these lesions coincided lung fibrosis was 
also present (Kiviluoto, Meurman and Hakama, 1979) (see 
next section). Although a malignant mesothelioma which 
apparently arose from the surface of a plaque has been 
reported there is no evidence to suggest that plaques are 
precursors of this tumour (Lewinsohn, 1974). 
To summarize 
The pathogenesis of pleural plaques in asbestos-exposed 
persons is a fascinating enigma but their bilateral presence 
at autopsy and in chest radiographs is, for practical 
purposes, like asbestos bodies, an index only of past 
asbestos exposure if other causes are excluded. They do not 
imply co-existent asbestosis as clinical and pathological 
evidence of this is present in less than 50 per cent of cases. 
On occasion, bilateral calcified plaques are seen in 
individuals with no known asbestos exposure (Figure 9.11). 
ASBESTOSIS 
Definition 
Asbestosis or asbestos pneumoconiosis, first recognized by 
Murray in 1907, is a bilateral diffuse interstitial pulmonary 
fibrosis (DIPF) caused by fibrous asbestos mineral dusts. 
Incidence and prevalence 
Accurate statistics of the incidence and prevalence of 
asbestosis are few, and valid comparisons between similar 
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Disorders proved to be related to asbestos exposure 249 
Figure 
9.9(b) 
1973 
Figure 9.9 Development of widespread calcified plaques of different patterns in costal and diaphragmatic parietal 
pleura over 25 years (a) 1948, (b) 1973. Asbestos insulation worker 40 years. Died aged 70. Post mortem 
confirmed parietal pleural plaques. Gross evidence of intrapulmonary fibrosis absent but mild asbestosis 
demonstrated microscopically with numerous asbestos bodies 
and dissimilar asbestos industries in one country or in 
different countries are not possible. In general, it is true to 
say that the disease has been most common in persons who 
worked in milling and disintegrating ore, in heat and sound 
insulation (lagging, stripping and spraying), and in ship-
yards. Figures are derived from surveys (usually radio-
graphic) of specific industries, compensation records and 
death certificates. Cases first diagnosed for compensation 
purposes (the trend of which in the UK is shown in Table 
1.2, p . 3) are of little value as they represent only those 
individuals who have been referred for examination and are 
not readily related to numbers 'at risk' in the industry in 
which they worked; and the accuracy of death certificates, 
in this respect, is severely limited. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that an overall rise in the 
incidence of asbestosis occurred in most industrial countries 
since the 1930s. This was due to the cumulative effect of the 
years of exposure when there was little dust control; to a 
great increase in the use of asbestos during and after the 
Second World War; and to an increased awareness of the 
existence of the disease and accuracy of diagnosis in latter 
years. It has also to be remembered that there is a consider-
able time lag between exposure and development of evident 
disease. However, where the incidence of asbestosis in 
longitudinal clinical and radiographic surveys of a given 
industry is related to dust count records it has been shown to 
decline with the application of strict dust control measures. 
Following controls imposed in the UK by the Asbestos 
Industry Regulations (1931) since 1933 a striking decline in 
new cases of asbestosis occurred in the asbestos cement and 
textile industries (Knox, Doll and Hill, 1965; Smither, 1965; 
Smither and Lewinsohn, 1973); but similar control was not 
applied to some other industries (for example, insulation) 
until 1970 (Asbestos Regulations, 1969). In the chrysotile 
industry in Rhodesia during the period 1963 to 1967, 39 
cases of asbestosis were diagnosed in 8336 workers (0.5 per 
cent) (Gelfand and Morton, 1970) and in South Africa for 
the period 1960 to 1971, 19 cases in 1350 workers (1.4 per 
cent) (Sluis-Cremer, 1973). 
An 'attack rate' of asbestosis of approximately 0.6 per 
cent has been observed in a random sample of employees of 
a British naval dockyard, first examined in 1966, when 
re-examined in 1977 (McMillan, Sheers and Pethybridge, 
1978). And an incidence 1.1 per cent per year over the 6V2 
years from 1965 to 1972 was found by Murphy et al. (1978) in 
shipyard pipe insulators in the USA. As there was an 80 per 
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Figure 9.10 Category 3rA silicosis in a crusher and grinder of flint and ochre ore for eight years. This work was done on the 
same site as an asbestos processing factory. Subsequently odd jobs brought him into close proximity with various parts of 
this factory for 20 years. Note the dense linear opacities indicative of calcification in both leaves of the diaphragm. Biopsy of 
lung ten years before death showed numerous asbestos bodies and confirmed silicosis. Post mortem: calcified plaques 
present in both leaves of diaphragm and smaller plaques on the costal surfaces, but no asbestosis 
cent reduction in the total amount of asbestos used in this 
period this rate is probably an expression of the time lag 
from the days of heavier exposure. 
There is no epidemiological evidence as to whether 
asbestosis is more likely to develop as a result of exposure to 
one particular type of fibre rather than another because 
asbestos workers have, in general, been exposed to 
different types of fibre in one process or successively in a 
variety of processes over the years. And, although a survey 
of asbestos cement workers suggests that exposure to 
crocidolite may have a greater fibrogenic effect than a 
similar total exposure to chrysotile (Weill etai, 1977), this is 
not supported by recent work with animals (Davis et ai.y 
1978). 
For the acquisition of systematic prospective information 
it is necessary to keep accurate records of the types of 
asbestos used in an industrial process and during what 
periods, and a diary of fibre count levels obtained by 
accurate sampling instruments in workers1 breathing zones 
and in the 'background1 air so that these data can be 
correlated with the development or absence of asbestos-
related disease. 
The most valuable diagnostic criteria to be sought in 
periodic surveillance of asbestos exposed working 
populations are persistent, bilateral, late inspiratory basal 
crepitations (see p. 256), irregular opacities in the chest 
radiograph (see p. 257) and reduction in VC and Tl (see p. 
257) (Murphy et aL, 1978). The order in which these 
abnormalities first present themselves may, however, differ 
in individual subjects. 
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